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This research delves into the phenomenon of computational propaganda on social media, 
and draws on social media specialists from some of South Africa’s best performing brands 
to explore potential strategies political parties can employ to mitigate against crises that 
occur as a result of computational propaganda.  
 
This research is of importance given that South Africa is entering its first ever National 
Elections since the identification of computational propaganda as a threat to electoral 
processes. To date, there is no research that explores this within the South African 
context. 
 
The research entailed semi-structured interviews with eight social media managers, 
selected using the purposive non-probability sampling method. In addition to this, the 
research interviewed a communications head from South Africa’s largest political party in 
order to assess what strategies are already in place. These two sets of data were 
consolidated resulting in four potential strategies to mitigate against the risk of 
computational propaganda. The four potential mitigation strategies are grouped into two 
approaches, the first approach relates to preventative measures political parties can take, 
namely protecting brand identity and aligning communications. The second approach 
related to defensive measures political party brands could take in the event of a 
computational propaganda event, namely online reputation management and integration of 
communication. 
 
The research further uncovered contextual considerations political party brands must take 
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Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia, 17 December 2010 (Lageman, 2016) Mohammed Bouazizi, a 26 year 
old fruit vendor and breadwinner to a household of seven people (Abouzied, 2011), takes 
his fruit cart to the local souk to begin the day’s trade. While making his way to the market, 
Bouazizi is approached by police officials, with whom he has a confrontational verbal 
exchange (Ryan, 2011b). Bouazizi later arrives at the market and is confronted again by 
police officials where the situation escalates quickly when Mohammed can only give $7 for 
a $10 fine. This act results in him being slapped in addition to the confiscation of his 
electronic scales and fruit cart (Abouzied, 2011). Frustrated that his livelihood had been 
taken away, Bouazizi later walks to the nearest government offices in his town to seek 
recourse to no avail. An hour after senior officials refuse to attend to his complaint, 
Bouazizi sets himself alight in frustration (Lageman, 2016). Shocked bystanders captured 
the spectacle and uploaded the content for distribution on Facebook, which was Tunisia’s 
only uncensored platform at the time (Ryan, 2011a). This moment became a symbol of the 
frustration North African youth felt as a result of socio-economic inequality and 
disenfranchisement (Salih, 2013), and would be the spark to a fire that would be later 
known as the Arab Spring (Toko, 2012). Starting in Tunisia, the Arab Spring became a 
civilian revolutionary movement that engulfed Algeria, Jordan, Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Syria 
and Bahrain (Salih, 2013), becoming one of the first civil society movements that spanned 
a multitude of countries simultaneously without having any central coordinating structures, 
making it one of the first revolutionary waves to reflect the changing power relations partly 
with the assistance of new communication networks like social media (Tudoroiu, 2014).  
This scenario illustrates the power social media can posses in democratising political 
influence. It also may be seen as a positive from civil society’s perspective, as it helped to 
overthrow traditional structures of political influence by giving it back to the general public 
(Salih, 2013). But what happens when nefarious forces sow division and manipulate this 
power? Enter a new social media and political phenomenon known as computational 
propaganda, which is the act of using social media’s power to spread inflammatory 




The latest global research on social media indicates that the world’s social media audience 
has grown to over 3 billion users daily (We Are Social, 2017). This rise in daily usage 
numbers around the world indicates that social media has begun to become a ubiquitous 
form of communication over the past two years (Katzman, 2016). While many benefits 
have come as a result of the growth of such platforms, there are some detrimental effects 
of this growth. One such effect is that social interactivity can present great reputational risk 
because it allows information to be shared at great speed with great reach, often with the 
page or profile owner-losing context, tone, and control (Carter, 2017). 
 
While most existing crisis communication research is focused on the general public and 
their response to brands or complaint behaviour, political parties are no strangers to the 
rigors of social media. Whereas commercial brands are pitted against irate customers, the 
emotive and ideological nature of politics may lay political parties and figures victim to 
online aggression at levels beyond those experienced by brands (Woolley and Howard, 
2017). Rost, Stahel and Frey (2016, p. 26) indicate that online aggression aimed at people 
and institutions of public interest has become a growing phenomenon, and it will continue 
to grow as digital civil society attempts to “enforce norms and contribute to the formation of 
latent interest groups”. Due to the ideological nature of politics and the norm of online 
aggression against them, political figures have begun to fall victim to a form of junk news 
called “computational propaganda”.  
Computational propaganda can be viewed as a digital form of information dissemination 
wherein parties or their adversaries use social media and online aggression to propagate 
damaging, often untrue information in attempts to create false narratives. Woolley and 
Howard (2016) define computational propaganda as “the assemblage of social media 
platforms, autonomous agents, and big data tasked with the manipulation of public 
opinion”. Automated bots are key to the manipulation of public opinion; these are 
automated social media accounts run by computer script, that are able to deploy 
messages, replicate and disseminate information at scale (Neudert, 2017). 
 
While evidence suggests that computational propaganda is a growing worldwide 
phenomenon, South Africa has also been impacted. For example a ‘white monopoly 
capital campaign’, wherein Bell Pottinger, a United Kingdom based public relations 
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agency, set up Gupta-aligned bots that suggested white owned businesses in South Africa 
were more implicated in state capture and more harmful than Gupta-owned businesses  
who were involved in state capture (ANCIR, 2017).   
 
South Africa is not the only location which is been affected by computational propaganda. 
The phenomenon has affected political processes the world over, with Brazil’s 2014 
elections being the earliest documented case. In this case, incumbent Brazillian President 
Dilma Rousseeff was forced into a run-off election at the hands of centre right candidate 
Aecio Nevez with the assistance of a multimillion dollar budget spent on misinformation 
using social media bots deployed on facebook, twitter and whatsapp (Arnaudo, 2017). The 
developed world has also not been left unaffected; in Europe during the French 
presidential election, scholars from Oxford’s Computational Propaganda project found that 
up to a quarter of all political links shared on twitter were found to contain political 
misinformation which was ideologically extreme or merely opinion presented as facts 
(Farand, 2017). In addition to this, further investigation into the use of botnets during the 
French election uncovered  Russian interference with the intent to destabilise the 
European Union.   
 
France is not the only European country to fall victim to botnets and computational 
propaganda. The effects of internet misinformation have also impacted electoral processes 
in Germany, where the growing right wing and their anti-immigration populist leaders 
gained audiences as a result of bot networks that were deployed to spread populist far-
right sentiment (Neudert, 2017). Italy, however, determined the computational propaganda 
threat to be so great that an online task team was assembled to report junk news sources. 
Most recently, the most notable instance of computational propaganda emerged in the 
American presidential elections where a consultancy named Cambridge Analytica was 
found to be harvesting data from 87 million Facebook users’ accounts to serve them with 
politically motivated content based on those users’ psychological profile (Greenfield, 
2018). Cambridge Analytica’s project, which was done without facebook’s consent, 
brought to light the large extent of politcial meddling taking place online, as their project is 
believed to have help mobilise neo-conservatives in getting to the polls in the 2016 US 
presidential elections, and thereby playing a critical role in Donald Trump’s presidential 




 While the impact of digital marketing and social media in the American election may come 
as a surprise, it’s important to note that digital marketing and social media have been an 
area of investment for political parties since Barack Obama’s successful presidential social 
media campaign in 2008 (Aaker and Chang, 2009).  Subsequently,  investment in recent 
elections have been substantial, for example, Republican candidate Senator Ted Cruz’s 
2016 campaign made a human captial investment of 40 data scientists, digital marketers 
and web developers. In addition, $4.4 million dollars of the $13 million digital marketing 
budget was paid to Cambridge Analytica during the Republican primaries (Kroll, 2018). 
Ultimately, the Cambridge Analytica scandal brought the phenomenon of computational 
propaganda to the forefront in global mainstream media, given that it was the first large-
scale instance where Facebook, the world's largest social network, admitted that it was 
used for political meddling, to the extent that Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg admitted 
to having his own personal data leaked during presentations to the US Senate (Jenkins, 
2018). 
 
In the white paper entitled “Why does junk news spread so quickly across social media?” 
Howard and Bradshaw, (2018) indicate that the growth of the computational propaganda 
phenomenon and junk news are a result of a number of factors including the rise of social 
media as a news source, growing mistrust the public have in the political elite and the way 
algorithms curate information optimised for engagement. Two other drivers of 
computational propaganda are (1) the use of pay per click advertising to generate revenue 
(wherein salacious and misleading headlines referred to as clickbait generate a high 
amount of clicks in return for money) (Howard and Bradshaw, 2018); and (2) filter bubbles, 
where users have reduced exposure to opposing information due to algorithms serving 
them the information it deems them most likely to consume (Pfeffer, Zorbach and Carley, 
2014) . All these elements have conspired to create what we’ve come to know as a “post 
truth” world (BBC, 2017) 
 
This post-truth scenario creates difficulties for political parties and those falling victim to 
computational propaganda. Howard and Bradshaw (2018) indicate that it is challenging to 
design or regulate social media in a way that reduces electoral interference.  
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They further argue that a solution would most likely require a multidisciplinary approach, 
consisting of technological tools to manage platforms and oversight from civil society and 
government. What this solution does not take into account, however, is the ever-changing 
attacks on people’s perceptions through communication, which suggests that a 
communication solution should also be found. The status quo suggests that political 
parties require communication defences that are just as fast, dynamic and adaptive as the 
attacks to which they fall victim. 
 
1.1.1 Problem Statement 
Although social media crisis communications have been an area of focus amongst 
communications scholars with the advent of web 2.0, computational propaganda has only 
come to the fore since 2012.  Succinctly defined, Computational Propaganda is the use of 
algorithms and automation to distribute misleading information via social media. Instances 
of this form of political manipulation have impacted democratic processes in many 
countries globally (Woolley and Howard, 2017). As already discussed, in the case of Brazil 
and South Africa, twitter bots spread misinformation, and in America and Europe, stolen 
Facebook data was used to target and psychologically manipulate voters (Woolley and 
Howard, 2017). Hence, Computational Propaganda involves sophisticated social media 
strategies to sway voters (Wickenden, 2018).  
Zhang et al. (2013) point out that the success of computational propaganda depends on its 
agents’ ability to create and deploy bot networks that are difficult to differentiate from 
humans online. In addition to social bot networks, agents of computational propaganda 
have also been found to use paid media to spread disinformation, as recently discovered 
by Facebook’s investigation into Russian use of paid Facebook adverts to influence 
election outcomes in America and Europe (Thompson and Vogelstein, 2018).  
The automated nature of Computational Propaganda may mean that existing strategies 
defining and diagnosing digital brand risk and destruction may not be sufficient. In light of 
the growing influence of Computational Propaganda and growing social media users, 
South Africa needs to deploy mitigation strategies in the upcoming 2019 elections. Theory 
on digital brand risk, and computational propaganda is still in its infancy, so it is unclear 
how South Africa might ameliorate the risks.  
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Therefore, in this research I have explored how South African political parties can mitigate 
the impact of Computational Propaganda during the South African elections. It is important 
to note that risk mitigation can take on two forms: reducing risk at the hands of the agents 
of Computational Propaganda, and reducing brand risk by attending to stakeholder’s 
perceptions once the computational propaganda has occurred, the latter is the focus of 
this study. 
 
1.1.2 Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this study is to help political parties avoid malicious online brand attacks by 
asking: 
Q: How can the brand risk of Computational Propaganda be mitigated by political party 
brands in online brand contexts? 
The potential answer to this question will be proposed based on an answer to the following 
sub-questions: 
1. How does Computational Propaganda manifest itself online? 
2. What strategies are political parties using to mitigate Computational Propaganda risks? 
3. Which digital brand risk mitigation strategies can political brands employ to mitigate the 
brand consequences of computational propaganda? 
The research proposed is of importance because a failure to identify and use relevant 
mitigation strategies against Computational Propaganda may cause political brands to lose 
their brand equity and, even worse, erode the legitimacy of their governance.  
1.1.3 Research objectives 
The objectives of the research conducted is to; 
• Explore the nature of how Computational Propaganda manifests online. 
• Investigate what strategies political parties are using to mitigate against 
Computational Propaganda risks. 
• Discover which digital brand risk mitigation strategies political parties can employ to 
mitigate against the brand consequences of Computational Propaganda. 
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1.1.4 Theoretical Framework 
This research is grounded in the modernist effectiveness model (Torp, 2015), wherein 
communication is a form of expression that occurs in a marketplace of different voices 
competing to persuade (Mumby, 1997). The research also draws on Verhoeven and Ihlen 
(2015) who argue that research is not only intended for administrative use at the 
organisational level, but also serves to supplement administrative perspectives with an 
approach that allows society to step back and evaluate the dynamics of societal and 
political influence. Ihlen and Verhoeven’s theory draws on elements of the critical theorist’s 
approach which value reflexivity and critical thought (Craig, 1999) – two aspects of 
research that will be used as a counterpoint to the modernist intent of exploring mitigation 
strategies for the communication crisis that is Computational Propaganda. Mumby (1997) 
indicates that democracy is central to the communication ethic of critical theory. A critical 
approach is important when interrogating phenomena that have influenced or changed the 
political power dynamic.  
 
While the modernist view will be used to explore functional ways in which Computational 
Propaganda may be mitigated, a lens of Critical modernism will balance the research, 
because it is critical, but not a complete rejection of modernism, instead it is a manner of 
questioning the mode of rationality that has come to be synonymous with the modernism 
(Mumby 1997). 
 Social media in the political context, suffers a tension between its ability to empower the 
disenfranchised, on one hand, and on the other hand, its ability to be used as a tool for 
mass misinformation, manipulation, and political meddling (Karolak, 2017). Therefore, my 
research is cognisant of the complex relation between communication, power, identity, 
society and systems of domination explored by critical modernism theorists (Deetz, 1992. 
Cited in Mumby, 1997). 
Beyond research paradigms, this study aims to close a knowledge gap that has risen out 
of the difference between the prevailing technological, political and communication 
context, versus existing theory. On one hand, political brands exist in the communication 
context of web 2.0, where communication can be shared on social media platforms at 
great reach and speed.  
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They also find themselves in a technological context wherein bad actors are automating 
social media bots to disseminate propaganda en masse in order to damage political 
brands. Furthermore, there is little to no regulation of social media platforms, ultimately 
putting political brands at risk of brand damage. 
On the other hand, existing theory indicates that brand building is important to political 
parties, while Computational Propaganda has a propensity to create communications 
crises, which negatively affect brand equity. Since private organisations have been 
employing brand risk mitigating strategies for some time, it is clear that political brands 
also need to deploy such strategies, and that we need to fill the knowledge gap on 
mitigation strategies. Platforms may not be willing to act on instances of Computational 
Propaganda, and bot agents may not be stopped, but political brands could try to manage 
perceptions of individuals coming into contact with Computational Propaganda by 
employing strategies employed by private organisations. 
 
1.1.5 Research Methods 
The research aims to conduct semi-structured interviews with eight social media managers 
to explore their opinions on brand risk mitigation strategies as a result of computational 
propaganda, followed by an interview with South African political party representatives to 
assess what mitigation strategies are in place for computational propaganda in the forth 
coming 2019 National Elections. The proposed research is not only qualitative, but also 
exploratory as it serves to gain insights on how political party brands are reacting to risks 
of Computational Propaganda and then provide suggestions on how they may respond 
(Creswell 2014). The relatively unpredictable nature of social media and the new nature of 
Computational Propaganda mean that insufficient studies are available that allow an 
outcome to be predicted, hence the need for a non-prescriptive, exploratory approach to 
provide broad guidelines for dealing with Computational Propoganda. 
 
1.1.6 Limitations of the study  
 
There may be gaps in how literature reflects the manifestation of computational 
propaganda and how this exists in the South African context.  
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In addition to this, the nature of South African politics means the sample size of political 
party communications practitioners is small with only two parties potentially having any 
experience in dealing with computational propaganda.  
 
A second limitation of this study is the emergent nature of computational propaganda, 
which means that some concepts presented in this study will evolve with time, ultimately 
affecting one’s interpretation of the outcomes. One such example is the use of the terms 
misinformation and disinformation. During the research and data gathering phase of this 
study, the interchangeable use of misinformation and disinformation emerged as a 
common trend in the literature reviewed, resulting in this practice being taken up by the 
author. One such example is Sergey Sanovich’s, 2017 paper investigating the role of bots 
in Russia. Sanovich’s paper titled “Computational Propaganda in Russia: The Origins Of 
Digital Misinformation,” has a citation recommendation within the same paper indicating 
that the title be cited as “Computational Propaganda in Russia: The Origins Of Digital 
Disinformation”, despite the content only referencing misinformation (Sanovich, 2017). 
Wardle and Derakhshan (2018) attempt to delineate between the concepts by identifying 
intent as being the key differentiator between the two. In the UNESCO journalism 
education handbook titled “Journalism, Fake News & Disinformation,” Wardle and 
Derakhshan (2018) propose that “Misinformation” is information that is false, disseminated 
by people who believe it to be true, whereas “Disinformation” is information that is false 
where people disseminating the information know it to be false. This matter should be 
taken into account when reviewing any content relating to Computational Propaganda, as 
even academics at the forefront of this research like Phillip Howard and Samuel Woolley 
have used the term misinformation to describe propaganda distributed by bots, which is an 
intentional action and ultimately disinformation. 
 
Finally, the assumption of this study is that social media practitioners from the private 
sector lead social media best practice, but this does not necessarily mean they are 
equipped or have any experience in dealing with individuals who are ideologically 
motivated and intent on wilfully damaging brands. Given that the research aims to provide 
insights, the small sample size, unique context and use of the purposeful non-probability 




1.1.7 Outline of the Report 
Chapter two provides context relating to political brands and how parallels can be drawn 
between political brands and commercial ones; it also outlines the nature of digital brand 
social media crises and crisis communication, followed by existing crisis communication 
risk mitigation strategies. Chapter three provides an in depth rationale pertaining to the 
research approach in conjunction to an outline of how the research within this report was 
undertaken. Chapter four sets out to uncover the findings gleaned from the primary 
research. Based on the findings recommendations for political parties are provided. 
 
1.1.8 Conclusion 
This chapter outlined the context of the research to be conducted, along with its relevance 
and the research lens through which the study will be viewed. The following chapters will 
delve into literature reviewed for the sake of the study, followed by the research 
methodology and data analysis. Finally the research will culminate in the findings and 






2 . Chapter 2 
2.1 Literature Review 
2.1.1 Introduction 
This study aims to explore communication-based mitigation strategies that political parties 
can deploy when facing the threat of computational propaganda. Therefore, in this chapter, 
the literature on political parties as brands and digital brand risk is explored in order to  
investigate the nature of social media and crises that come as a result of it. Thereafter 
Computational Propaganda and existing risk mitigation strategies employed in 
communication will be outlined. 
 
2.1.2 Political Parties as Brands 
In order to understand the relevance of digital brand risk, the importance of brands to 
political parties is discussed. A brand can be defined as a name, term, sign, symbol or 
design intended to identify the goods and services of one seller, or group of sellers and to 
differentiate them from those of competitors (Keller, 2013). While the physical attributes of 
a brand are described in this definition, the all-encompassing nature of brands and the 
extent to which they influence marketing effectiveness is best outlined by Keller’s (1993) 
model of Consumer-Based Brand Equity. Within this four step model, brand effectiveness 
is based on sentiment, and that brands can reach the ultimate goal of brand resonance by 
answering four questions in relation to the consumer, namely, (1) who is the brand, (2) 
what is the brand, (3) what is the brand’s relevance in consumers’ lives, and (4) how does 
the brand make the customer feel. Consumer-Based Brand Equity is defined as the 
differential effect brand knowledge has on consumer response to the marketing of the 
brand. Based on Keller’s definition, Consumer-Based Brand Equity is a function of 
knowledge and experience over time. This knowledge and experience can either positively 
affect or negatively affect the customers’ response to a brand. Ultimately, brands can allow 
an organisation to gain supporters and fend off attempts by competitors.  
 
Keller (2013) suggests that a brand can improve customer’s feelings towards products, 
improve repeat purchase and make competitors actions less effective.  
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Brands are not only trademarks or reputations, but also complex intangibles whose 
character emerges from a blend of attributes. If one considers the attributes of the 
Customer Brand Based Equity model one can surmise that building an organisation’s 
brand is important for building relationships with consumers/audiences. Audiences as 
voters are also important to political parties, which Butler, Collins and Speed ( 2011) 
describe as the complex sum of three main parts which are party, person and policy. Pich, 
Armannsdottir and Spry (2018) argue that the application of corporate brand theory to the 
political arena has helped political parties to develop desired identities in order to create 
credible offerings to stakeholders. Therefore, political party brand management has begun 
to generate a return on investment from a reputational capital and social capital 
perspective. However, the brand can build or damage voters’ trust, especially in the 
context of social media and crisis communication, because crises may erode loyalty 
amongst political party members and make organisations vulnerable to tactics of 
competing political entities. 
 
The notion of political parties as brands has become a prominent area in the growing field 
political marketing (Harris and Lock, 2010), which according to Lees-Marshment (2003) is 
a powerful way in which parties can foster deeper relationships with voters. Mensah (2017) 
indicates that the prominence of political branding has come about as a result of political 
convergence where parties are increasingly moving to the centre in order to focus on 
voters’ needs, coupled with a decline in ideology politics. The ideology-centred politics is 
similar to the mostly outmoded practice of product and sales marketing, which serves 
customers based on what the organisation believes, is valued by the customer. Downer 
(2016) reinforces this assertion by indicating that the shift in politics to voter needs is akin 
to a shift towards the market-oriented marketing perspective where businesses research 
customer’s needs and market their products or services according to these needs. 
Drawing on Keller’s (1993) definition of brand equity, Downer (2016) further points out that 
the shift to viewing political parties as brands indicates a shift to an emphasis on a long 
term view on marketing decisions. 
Ahmed, Lodhi and Ahmad (2017) also affirm the relevance of brands in the political 
context, arguing that brand management helps parties learn about voter preferences. 
Branding assists voters by providing benefits by which they are able to evaluate their 
political choices. O’Cass and Voola (2011) more directly point to the link between political 
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party and brand, arguing that party managers, politicians and members relate to their 
perception of their brand and how the brand links to a set of capabilities which set the 
party apart in the political arena.  
 
Based on the above literature, it is clear that concepts of marketing and brand equity are 
easily imported into the political space, even though the brand literature does not account 
for religion, social class and social change, which in recent times have seen a resurgence 
of prominence within the political landscape, most especially as it pertains to the rise of 
right wing populism and religious extremism (Wood, Daley and Chivers, 2018). Mensah 
(2017) nevertheless argues that class, religion and social change are not any more 
significant than other interests and behaviours that are subject to influence 
 Given that brand equity is important to political parties, they are susceptible to the brand 
risk just as commercial brands are, so it is important to explore mitigating strategies 
against this phenomenon. The concept of social media and brand risk will be further 
explored in order to provide context into the nature of this phenomenon and to explore 
whether there is scope for potential mitigation strategies.  
 
2.1.3 Web 2.0 and Social Media  
According to Castells (2007) and Manovich (2009), two-way networked sociality arrived 
with the advent of web 2.0 during the turn of the millennium. Web 2.0 is often referred to 
as the successor to the “read only web”, or web 1.0 which existed from 1989 to 2005 
(Choudhury, 2014) and was characterised by data posted to websites for users to simply 
view, read or download. During this period user contribution and feedback was not 
available to most internet users and websites on the internet resembled traditional mass 
communication platforms in terms of their one-to-many orientation (Mangalore and 
Shivalingaiah, 2014).  
In contrast to the read only web, the read-write web, or web 2.0 as it is commonly referred 
to (Dougherty 2004), was built to harness the power of network effects (O’Reilly, 2006) 
and transitioned one-to-many communication into many-to-many communication. 
Choudhury (2014) argues that Web 2.0 facilitates participatory, collaborative, distributive 
practices, and has distinct, characteristic relationships to technology such as wikis, 
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podcasts, RSS feeds and Application programming interfaces (Mangalore and 
Shivalingaiah, 2014).  
The advancement from web 1.0 to web 2.0, characterised by mass participation and 
openness, have played a critical part in the new political context in which Computational 
Propaganda has thrived. Social media networks are at the centre of the new political 
context, since they allow for interactivity where participants can send, receive and process 
content, thus levelling the playing field such that users can give each other feedback in 
realtime, instead of just consuming mass media (Aula, 2010). Carr and Hayes (2015) 
describe social media as internet-based channels of mass-personal communication, 
facilitating perceptions and interactions among users. Their definition touches on social 
media’s unique duality in that it can be personal and mass communication at the same 
time, while also allowing anyone to become a publisher. Social Media however, is not just 
the ability for users to provide immediate feedback; these networks are more than the sum 
of their parts and represent a new paradigm of openness, community and democracy. 
 
Kaplan and Haenlein (2010) further illustrate the collaborative power of social media that 
has risen out of web 2.0, arguing that social media networks are internet applications 
which build on the ideological and technological foundation of web 2.0, thus allowing 
creation and exchange of user generated content. Key to this web 2.0 ideology, as well as 
the creation and exchange of user-generated content are levels of openness amongst 
different social media platforms. Deng, Fang, Monod and Qi (2018) distinguish between 
three levels of social media openness, i.e.  (1) open platforms such as Twitter by default 
allow any users to connect without permission and see and share content posted; (2) 
semi-open platforms such as Instagram allows users to primarily engage only with the 
followers they select; and (3) closed networks such as Facebook which require users’ 
permission before connections are made. The importance of openness is critical to the 
study of Computational Propaganda as this directly impacts on how easy or difficult it is to 
identify Computational Propaganda.  According to Kramer (2017) Twitter’s openness 
allows developers to access its Application programming interface, which in turn allows 
network analysis of connections between accounts. By contrast, Facebook’s closed nature 





While the perks of relationship technologies include collaboration and participation at no 
cost to the end user, the pitfalls of web 2.0 and social media include less control by its 
users and reduced data security since these platforms increase the flow of personal 
information onto the networks where data is hosted and controlled (Grabner-Kräuter, 
2009). Data vulnerability and its effects are further compounded by the monetisation 
models used by large social networks like Facebook, Instagram and Twitter. These social 
networks allow users to access content and worldwide networks at no cost, but due to the 
cost-intensive nature of the infrastructure to run these networks, social networks are 
monetized by using their depth of freely acquired user data and selling it as audiences to 
advertisers. This monetization model has turned social networks into “defacto data 
brokers, who go about aggregating data on users for the purpose of implementing 
powerful advertising platforms” (Venkatadri et al., 2018, p. 89). Krishnamurthy, Willis and 
Naryshkin (2009) point out that mainstream social media sites, when used on default, have 
great potential for data leakages. Venkatandri et al. (2018) corroborate this assertion, 
explaining that social media networks have been a vector for privacy attacks due to bad 
actors that are able to predict an individual’s attributes based on small pieces of users 
information which are easily acquired online. An illustration of this scenario can be found in 
Facebook’s recent instances of data leakages wherein the world’s largest social network 
by daily users fell victim to manipulation by bad actors (Facebook, 2018). The most 
prominent instance being 2018’s Cambridge Analytica scandal, where researchers 
violated Facebook’s terms of service by gathering 87 million users’ personal data (Wagner, 
2018) which was acquired via friends who had completed a quiz application (Cadwalladr 
and Graham-Harrison, 2018). These records were subsequently used to develop 
psychographic profiles of users in order to deliver specific pro-Donald Trump adverts to 
them (Meredith, 2018). 
E-proponents have long argued that Web 2.0 platforms such as social media have the 
potential to reconnect citizens with governments and open up new civic spaces online 
(Ward, 2017). This argument is in line with Kaplan and Haelein’s (2010) definition of Web 
2.0 which highlights the ability for users to create content, help set the agenda and, 
ultimately, create a shift in power. Social media use in the Arab spring (Salih 2013) and the 
resultant revolutionary wave, which helped to rearrange power relations in the North 
African, and Middle Eastern region (Tudoroiu, 2014) are a testament to social media’s 
ability to open up civic spaces online. However, Kaplan and Haenlein’s thoughts are in 
stark contrast to traditional management scholars who possess a modernistic worldview 
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like Anshul, Pathak, Safiullah and Singh (2017) who believe that social media is a form of 
digital media that provides political marketers with a marketplace where they compete to 
drive public opinion in a desired direction, ultimately suggesting that political marketing is 
still a discipline in which narratives can be controlled . 
The initial rise of web 2.0 technologies led scholars to believe that social networks gave a 
communication platform to the general public, ultimately dis-intermediating traditional 
communications organisations and handing power over to users (Rust and Oliver, 1994). 
However, consensus is changing as knowledge regarding how social media users’ data is 
being used increases. Although users of social media have helped to “transform 
everything from political arrangements to business models, organisations and 
philosophies” (Fitzpatrick, 2012), the power has actually shifted from social media users to 
social media platforms that are now able to influence their users’ perceptions through the 
power of their data and algorithms, which were initially developed to benefit advertisers. 
Martin (2018, p. 30) succinctly touches on this paradigm in the MIT Technology Review, 
arguing that  “Facebook, Google and Amazon all have business models that require them 
to scoop up large amounts of data about people to power their algorithms, and they derive 
their power from this information”. The power of social media platforms create tension for 
political parties trying to set the agenda in that these traditional arbiters of power are pitted 
against a society that has relatively more control and has grown increasingly sceptical of 
the political elite’s motives. However the tension is layered on top of social media 
platforms whose algorithms have potential to influence users and invariably set the agenda 
(Unver, 2017), especially when they are manipulated by bad actors, all of which pose 
potential threats for political party brands. A larger question, which falls outside the ambit 
of this research, is the intention versus business model debate, which asks if social media 
platforms are deliberately facilitating negative political messaging to maximise user 
engagement and thus increase revenue; this business model invariably leads to more 
extreme emotional messaging on social networks (Unver, 2017). 	
2.1.4 Digital Brand Risk  
Hofman and Simeon (2013) define brand risk as any element that can diminish total brand 
value. They also indicate that this destruction can take on many guises by pointing out that 
brand risk ranges from malicious attacks to self-inflicted action, both of which affect brand 
value negatively.  
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Patrick Marrinan, in an interview with GfK-Marketing Intelligence Review (Hupp, Robbins 
and Fournier, 2018), corroborates Hofman and Simeon’s assertion by indicating that Brand 
Risk is any event, condition or action that has potential to negatively affect a brand’s value 
in the market. In creating their mathematical model of Brand Risk, Florea, Munteanu and 
Postoaca (2016) point out that consistent analysis of brand risk and brand profit are 
integral to the success of an organisation, as these are two of the most important 
indicators of brand equity, which in turn is a key but intangible attribute of any organisation.  
 
 While it is not possible to outline all brand risks, an exploration into nature of digital brand 
risk is imperative for the purpose of this study. In an outline of the nature of Digital Brand 
Risk, Hofman and Simeon (2013) borrow from David Abraham’s (2007) Brand Risk model  
to delineate four areas of brand risk faced online, i.e.  identity risks, nature of presence 
risks, equity risks, and reputation risks. Identity risks entail using a brand’s trademark, 
usernames and domain names to take advantage of the high levels of traffic brands 
receive online. Presence risk is similar to identity risk and occurs when competitors take 
advantage of a brand's identity and attributes to attract potential buyers, only to sell their 
own competing products. Equity risks entail damage sustained to a brand when its 
functional and emotional benefits do not meet expectations of customers (Abrahams, 
2007). Hofman and Simoen suggest that equity risks can have the most detrimental impact 
on brands as emotional connections take time to cultivate and are not easily regained 
(Hofman and Simeon, 2013). The fourth and final brand risk is that of reputation when a 
brand does not deliver according to expectations and falls short of legal or ethical 
requirements.  
 
Reputational and equity risks are two of the most detrimental risks for any organisation 
because reputation and equity take extremely long to build, which is why they have 
become targets of attack by actors in the political space in recent years (Hofman and 
Simeon, 2013). Theory pertaining to brand risk, unfortunately, does not explore the nature 
of sabotage by external actors. This shortfall is however covered by the theory of brand 
destruction (Bokor, 2014), which is the seizure of power by consumers. Although 
communicating on social media lends itself to self-inflicted communication crises, the 
phenomenon of brand destruction is described by Bokor (2014, p. 40) as “the intentional 
destruction of a brand by a gatekeeper, opinion leader, consumer group or internet users, 
and may come as a result of conflicting worldviews or a conflict with a brand”. Bokor builds 
on research conducted by Krishnamurthy and Kucuk (2009) who investigated the rapid 
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growth of anti-branding websites, which came as a result of growing customer influence 
initiated by the advent of the internet. Kucuk and Krishnamurthy (2009, p. 1120) explain 
that “[a]nti-brand web sites are online spaces that focus negative attention on a specific 
targeted brand. Such sites use visual expression, memorable domain names, and critical 
language to create a negative online identity for the targeted brand”. 
 
 
They further argue that anti-branding differs from complaint behaviour because complaint 
behaviour attempts to improve or affect change in future business transactions, whereas 
anti-branding aims to create a negative brand image with no intention of future 
transactions (Krishnamurthy and Kucuk, 2009). Kucuk’s other research postulates that 
brands attract anti-brand behaviour based on the level of brand equity they attain, he also 
goes on to put forth response strategies to anti-brand behaviour based on a brand’s level 
of equity (Kucuk, 2008). Kucuk’s typology thus points to the type of mitigation strategies, 
even when dealing with bad actors that seek no resolution, that could be relevant to how 
political parties address Computation Propoganda, and the bots-as-bad-actors. While 
there is a growing amount of research relating to anti-branding from a website perspective, 
Bokor’s wider reaching Brand Destruction on social media theory has not gained 
significant traction, most likely because attacks by customers or the general public is 
considered to fall within the ambit of crisis communication. Kucuk (2008) shows that the 
literature often obscures the difference between anti-branding and complaint or evaluation 
platforms. The issue with this however is that existing crisis communication theory does 
not take into account the vindictive actions of competitors, or other automated bad actors 
who generate firestorms with no intention of achieving resolution or enacting a behavioural 
change. 
 
2.1.5 Computational Propaganda  
Researchers at the forefront of Computational Propaganda research and founders of 
Oxford’s Computational Propaganda Project, Samuel Woolley and Philip Howard, have 
undertaken a two-year project to analyse social media platforms, national security 
incidents and political crises around the globe. The ground-breaking, extensive research 
into Computational Propaganda has led them to define it as: “[t]he use of algorithms, 
automation and human curation to purposefully distribute misleading information over 
social media networks” (Woolley and Howard, 2017).  
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Given that Computational Propaganda research is still in its infancy, researchers 
worldwide have cooperated to form the Computational Propaganda Project and hence 
opposing perspectives are not yet prominent. However, the literature does cover some 
different perspectives on the use of algorithms, automation and human curation, which are 
key elements within Computational Propaganda. 
 
2.1.5.1 Algorithmic filtering 
Research undertaken by We Are Social indicates that the world’s population of three billion 
social media users spend up to three hours and 57 minutes a day on social media (We Are 
Social, 2018). While one dimension of this stickiness relates to our ability to connect to the 
content and people closest to us (Mosseri, 2018). The other dimension of this stickiness 
comes as a result of algorithms designed to keep users engaged on platforms, by serving 
tailored content and adverts based on user interests. Early Facebook investor and advisor 
to Mark Zuckerberg, Roger McNamee (2018) crystalizes this assertion by indicating that 
these algorithms have allowed social media platforms to commoditise user attention to the 
extent that the technology community often refer to advertisers as social media’s true 
customers, while social media users are referred to as the product. For this reason, 
Howard (2018) suggests that social media’s ubiquity, coupled with users’ ability to 
veraciously consume content, creates an ideal target for political operators to manipulate 
and deceive, especially when taking into account the highly automated nature of newsfeed 
algorithms and their predisposition for serving users with tailored, engaging content, which 
is sometimes inflammatory, and often emotive and polarizing (Brady et al., 2017). 
 
In “Gatekeeping Algorithms with Human Ethical Bias”, Dr Martijn Van Otterlo (2018) draws 
on Eli Pariser’s work which investigates the rise of internet filters that narrow the amount of 
information we see based on preferences (Pariser, 2011). Van Otterlo (2018) indicates 
that algorithms have the potential to create filter bubbles which can reinforce people’s 
biases; conversely, he also indicates that disallowing some content may be seen as a form 
of censorship given the size of Facebook’s more than 1.7 billion active users.  Ciampaglia 
(2017) is a little more nuanced in his assessment of algorithmic filtering and points out that 
biases are a natural element of social behaviour and to exist in a world with limited 
attention spans, social media platforms need to tune their algorithms for engagement and 
popularity signals. He does however acknowledge that algorithmic bias coupled with the 
‘homophilistic’ structure of social networks are a cause for concern given their potential to 
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create echo chambers. Finally, he indicates that solutions for filter bubbles are a moving 
target for computational social scientists due to the fact that social media platforms are 
continuously tuning their algorithms. 
 
The concern related to filter bubbles is in stark contrast to the future envisioned by 
scholars such as Professor Yochai Benkler (2006) who, during the rise of Web 2.0, 
theorised about a future “networked information economy” where platforms like Wikipedia 
would bring about the democratisation of information due to the rise of user generated 
content and social production or decentralised, consensus based information. Akin Unver 
(2017) reinforces this idealistic notion by pointing out that the rise of digital connectedness 
was supposed to do good for democracy by helping to give representation to 
disenfranchised segments of the population.  
 
One might argue that Yochai Benklers idealistic prediction was made before the rise of 
platforms like Facebook, which, due to the sheer number of its user base, is viewed in 
developing countries as the internet itself (Mirani, 2015).  Benkler’s prediction also 
assumes that the internet simply connects people, whereas Howard, Woolley and Calo 
(2018, p. 81) believe this is not the case because the web 2.0 internet connects people 
through a layer of technology or “an interface, platform, or network which someone has 
designed”. They further argue that algorithms may be prone to reinforce the biases of their 
creators. 
  
Unver (2017) agrees with Howard, Woolley and Calos’s (2018) assertion, arguing that 
algorithms have created polarisation and confusion within online communities through the 
oversupply of information. These concerns are a central tenet to the study of algorithmic 
bias (Garcia-Gathright, Springer and Cramer, 2018), but it also points to how algorithms 
can assist in the ‘weaponisation’ (Ahmed, Kuchler and Garrahan, 2018) of social media.   
 
In contrast to the popular critiques around algorithms, Messing and Westwood (2014) 
question the growing apprehension towards algorithmic filtering. They argue that selective 
exposure was inherent in watching television, reading the newspaper and consuming web 
1.0, and this reduced the public’s exposure to ‘counterattitudinal’ content well before 
algorithms gained prominence. Messing and Westwood (2014) go further to indicate that 
social media users, with their connections to colleagues, friends, family and 
acquaintances, are more likely to come into contact with diverse political views and 
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opinions. Most importantly, their research suggests that social sharing of political articles 
act as social endorsement, because more people with diverse views read it since social 
endorsements are a stronger predictor of news selection than news source. Flaxman, Goel 
and Rao (2016) subsequently conducted research using browsing data to investigate the 
veracity of both the filter bubble and social endorsement theory. They found a higher 
ideological segregation amongst articles discovered via social media channels, however, 
they also found that the websites visited were associated with high exposure to direct 
visitors with opposing perspectives, ultimately finding in favour of both sides of the debate. 
 
Algorithmic filtering remains an area of great debate within both the computational social 
science and technological arena (Ciampaglia, 2017). Unfortunately, scientists’ ability to 
come to a definitive understanding of its effects may not be feasible given that these 
algorithms are proprietary, change constantly, and form a critical part of social networks’ 
revenue generation models (Hosanagar and Jair, 2018). For this reason, how these 
algorithms work and their effects may remain hidden under a veil of secrecy. 
 
 
2.1.5.2 Automation  
According to Woolley and Howard (2017), bots are automated programs integral to the 
spread of Computational Propaganda and are built to perform simple, repetitive, robotic 
tasks rapidly. Due to their wide-ranging abilities, bots have been used successfully to 
spread misinformation. However, Anstead, Carr, Halford, Murthy, Powell, Tinati and Weal 
(2016, p. 4955) view bots as a “subcategory of algorithmic media elements, because they 
are programmed to intervene in the way knowledge and information is communicated”. 
Combining these two positions, Unver (2017) suggests that bots and algorithmically-
generated search results can operate in tandem to disrupt the flow of information with 
incorrect or old information.  
 
Ultimately these theoretical perspectives indicate that bot nets and algorithmic filtering 
have worked hand-in-hand to spread misinformation on social networks due to the bot’s 
ability quickly disseminate inflammatory content widely so users can engage. Engagement 
ultimately leads to more users seeing the content as a result of how social network 
algorithms were designed. While the 2016 American presidential election was a watershed 
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moment which saw the evolution of Computational Propaganda techniques (Howard, 
2018), automation in the form of bots have long been identified as an early tool for the 
spread of misinformation on social media. The earliest documented large-scale instance 
originated in Russia when 14 million tweets targeting Ukrainian citizens were published by 
1.3 million fake accounts between February 2014 and December 2015 (Woolley and 
Howard, 2017).  
 
Phillip Howard (2018) outlines five tactics employed by bot nets to achieve nefarious 
political ends on social media. The first tactic is termed Zombie Electioneering, which is 
the use of bots to give the appearance of wide support for a political candidate by 
automated commenting, scripted dialogue and other means.  The second method, termed 
astroturfing is the technique of making an electoral campaign appear to originate from a 
grassroots effort, appearing to have public consensus where there is none. Third is 
hashtag jacking, which is the practise of appropriating a candidate’s hashtag to distribute 
spam and undermine support. Retweet storms are the fourth commonly used tactic which 
entails simultaneously reposting or retweeting posts or tweets by hundreds or thousands 
of other bots. The last tactic employed is strategic flagging, which is the use of bots to flag 
legitimate content as inappropriate, which can lead to erroneous deletion by social media 
platforms (Howard, 2018) .  
 
Automated bot networks have become a popular weapon in the Computational 
Propaganda arsenal. Ciampaglia (2017) points out that social bots, despite being 
responsible for the spread of large amounts of misinformation, can be employed to positive 
ends. Howard and Kollanyi (2016) reinforce this notion by pointing out that bots can 
perform tasks that range from legitimate actions like sharing news, updating feeds, 
responding to customer queries, and fact checking, which suggests that good bots can be 
deployed in the fight against misinformation. As reassuring as this suggestion might be, 
empirical research conducted by Murthy et al. (2016) points out that creating and 
deploying bots effectively requires technological, social, economic, and temporal capital, 
which suggests that only people, institutions or organisations with large financial resources 






According to Santini et al. (2018) bots are the most widely investigated manipulation 
agents when it comes to computational propaganda, but trolls who curate and propagate 
content can also be used to create noise. Research conducted by Oxford’s Computational 
Propaganda project indicates that social media curation by trolls formed a fundamental 
part of Russia’s Internet Research Agency’s misinformation attacks during the 2016 US 
Presidential election (Francois, Ganesh, Howard, Kelly and Liotsiou, 2018). A key finding 
of the research, which drew on Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and Instagram data between 
2015 and 2017, is that a total of 195 032 content pieces were posted on these platforms, 
and resulted in more than thirty million shares, thirty eight million likes, and three million 
comments (Francois, Ganesh, Howard, Kelly and Liotsiou, 2018).  
These posts, which were made to appear as being posted by concerned American 
citizens, received exponentially more traction that misinformation adverts and bot 
propagated content run at the same time (Salinas, 2018). The difference between this 
campaign and regular bot networks was that some posts referred to Russian troll farms 
with messages of denial, while other accounts complained about the various social media 
platforms’ political biases when faced with the prospect of being suspended. These 
dynamic responses to common complaints about bots made the trolling appear to be more 
authentic and effective due to being operated by humans (Howard et al., 2018). 
 
In a summary of worldwide computational propaganda events which was compiled by 
Oxford’s Computational Propaganda project, Woolley and Howard point out that some of 
the most powerful forms of computational propaganda involve the coupling of algorithmic 
distribution and human curation (Woolley and Howard, 2017). The findings of Francois, 
Ganesh, Howard, Kelly and Liotsiou’s 2018 report reinforce this assertion by pointing out 
that the success of the Russian’s organic campaign came as a result of Russian’s Internet 
Research Agency’s use of click farms and their fluency in American trolling culture. Santini 
et al. (2018) indicate that there is a growing trend of combining human action, big data, 
and automation to refine the application of Computational Propaganda. The level of 
sophistication due to dynamism inherent with having humans curate content suggests that 
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a single technological, legal or platform-based measure is not enough to reduce the effects 
of computational propaganda, but a multi-disciplinary approach may be required. 
 
2.1.6 Online Reputation Management 
The interactive collaborative nature of web 2.0 has created an environment where a 
brands’ meaning is no longer what corporate organisations say they are, but are rather a 
negotiated construct between brand users and the creators of these brands (Ligas and 
Cotte, 1999). In Managing Online User Brand Risk, Verwey and Muir (2014) make mention 
of web-based power struggles between marketers and consumers who challenge 
accepted branding truths and paradigms, which has given rise to the discipline of Online 
Reputation Management, more commonly known as ORM. By definition, Online 
Reputation Management is the practice of monitoring media, detecting relevant contents, 
analysing what people say about an entity and if necessary, interacting with customers 
(Amigo, Artiles, Gonzalo, Spina, Liu and Corujo, 2010). Coupled to this definition, Amigo et 
al. (2010) point out that negative comments in online media can seriously harm 
organisations and therefore ORM has become increasingly important. Portmann (2012) 
takes the basis of the Amigo et al. definition and provides a more succinct and proactive 
definition for online reputation management; he points out that online reputation 
management is not only the task of monitoring but also addressing or rectifying 
undesirable or negative search engine results pages, or mentions on social media. 
According Cerebra, one of South Africa’s leading social media management agencies, in 
the South African context Online Reputation Management is a two-stage process where 
the task of monitoring, detecting and analysing content falls within the ambit of the social 
media analyst function, while the job of addressing, interacting and responding falls under 
the responsibility of the community manager (Beale, 2012).   Cottica, Melançon and 
Renoust (2017) outline the importance and dynamism inherent in community management 
by indicating that successful online communities employ professionals sometimes called 
community managers or moderators who mediate conflict, police unwanted behaviour, and 
influence emergent social dynamics because online communities encompass interactions 




These definitions and descriptions suggest that community managers are often on the 
front lines, defending and protecting brand equity when organisations face brand risk 
situations on social networks and online communications channels. Syme (2014) 
corroborates this and goes on to show that individuals managing social media for brands 
are required to be communications professionals, with creative sensibilities and 
backgrounds in marketing. Syme (2014) also points out the ability to recognise the warning 
signs of a crisis, create triage responses, respond in brand voice, understand crisis cycles 
and operate under pressure as being key abilities of social media or community managers. 
Ultimately, the contributions of Syme (2014), Cottica, Melançon and Renoust (2017), 
Beale (2012), Portmann (2012) and Amigo et al. (2010) indicates the insight, skill and 
value social media community managers can bring to political brands when dealing with 
crises that arise as a result of Computational Propaganda.   
 
2.1.7 Risk Mitigation Strategies 
Taking Bokor’s (2014) assertion “that brand destruction is the intentional destruction of a 
brand by internet users” into account, one can view computational propaganda as a form 
of brand destruction through the use of algorithms and automation. Given that 
Computational Propaganda can create communication crises, it may be possible to use 
existing crisis communication strategies to deal with Computational Propaganda, which is 
the premise of this study. 
 
A number of risk mitigation strategies exist in communications at the moment that may act 
a basis for which to respond to brand risk and Computational Propaganda.Hirschman’s 
(Hirschman, 1970) work on public choice theory titled “Exit, Voice and Loyalty” provides a 
basis for understanding stakeholders’ perceptions and encourages maintaining a dialogue 
with disgruntled stakeholders as this is good for the organisation’s defensive marketing 
efforts. Singh’s Dissatisfaction Response Theory (Singh, 1990) builds on Hirschman’s 
theory and brings into focus how different individuals will react in situations where a brand 
falls short of expectations. 
 
The Dissatisfaction Response Styles Theory indicates certain levels of dissatisfaction can 
be positive, but it also allows us to focus on the stakeholders that are willing to go to great 
lengths to tarnish brands. (Coombs, 2007) puts forth that a crisis can be defined as a 
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sudden and unexpected event that serves to disrupt organisational operations, ultimately 
posing both financial and reputational threats. Coombs (2007) further notes that crisis 
communication begins with attending to concerns of stakeholders from a physical and 
psychological perspective, an assertion that highlights the importance of managing 
perceptions.  
 
Coombs reinforces Benoit's (1995) notion by describing crises as socially constructed 
situations. The key take away from these theories is that it is not facts, but stakeholders’ 
interpretations that matter in a crisis and that these interpretations should be managed 
depending on context (Coombs, 2014). Coomb’s Situational Crisis Communication Theory 
(SCCT), a framework that determines how organisations should respond in times of crisis, 
has become a seminal work in the crisis communication field; scholars have adapted 
SCCT for application in web 2.0 contexts, giving rise to the Blog Mediated Crisis 
Communications model (BMCC) and the Social Mediated Crisis Communication model 
(SMCC) (Cheng, 2018). Coombs’ SCCT and the subsequent SMCC model posited by Liu, 
Austin and Jin (2011) may mean that while a brand may not want to give credence to fake 
news by engaging the agents of Computational Propaganda, it may want to assess the 
perceptions of its followers that come into contact with this propaganda and take action 
(Timothy Coombs and Jean Holladay, 2014).  
 
While existing crisis communications strategies have merit, they do not account for web 
2.0 and the inherent speed, reach, impact and complexity of crisis communications in a 
connected world (Veil, Buehner and Palenchar, 2011). This gap has given rise to the 
concept of online reputation management, which entails assessing stakeholder sentiment, 
identifying discourses and detecting online communication threats (Steenkamp and 
Rensburg, 2016) . Online communication threats are said to differ from communications 
crises of old as they are characterised by high volumes of negative word of mouth, 
disseminated with extreme speed, often with intense indignation and no specific criticism 
(Pfeffer, Zorbach and Carley, 2014). Aula (2010) argues that the interactive nature of 
social media dictates that participation and continuous efforts to create shared meaning is 
encouraged during crises. Aula ( 2010) further states that the unique nature of social 
media crises will result in a general shift from a world of careful planning and strategy, to 






The outlined environment and existing academic theory means that positive brand equity 
can help ensure the long-term survival of political organisations. However, the 
unpredictable nature of social media coupled with computational propaganda can expose 
gaps in existing crisis communication practises because they have a basis in theory 
conceptualised in a time before web 2.0. 
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3 . Chapter 3 
3.1 Research Methodology 
3.1.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the methods with which to explore mitigation strategies for 
Computational Propaganda. Firstly the research approach and rationale will be outlined, 
followed by a description of the sampling strategy; thereafter the method of data collection 
and analysis will be provided. The chapter will close with ethical considerations and 
trustworthiness of interviews conducted to explore mitigation strategies for computational 
propaganda. 
 
3.1.2 Research Approach 
Given that this research serves to explore mitigation strategies for political brands that may 
face Computational Propaganda, it is important to note that although brand value is a 
quantifiable concept, the equity of a brand is often based on subjective concepts like 
judging, feeling and resonance (Keller 2013). As a result, the extent to which 
Computational Propaganda affects a brand in this context cannot be quantified by 
numerical analysis, nor can the effects of mitigating factors. The subjective nature of this 
topic means that the research relies on qualitative data based on the opinions of 
experienced respondents in order to maintain credibility.  
 
According to Creswell (2014) researchers use the qualitative method to probe a topic 
when variables and base theory are unknown. Flick (2015) reinforces this notion by 
indicating that qualitative research is less focused on testing what is known, and instead 
aims to discover new aspects. According to Garner, Kawulich and Wagner (2012) 
qualitative research is concerned with understanding the process, social and cultural 
contexts which shape various behavioural patterns, it strives to create a coherent story as 
seen through the eyes of those who are part of the story. In order to do this, qualitative 
research seeks insights through structured in-depth analysis that is mainly interpretive and 




 Creswell references Janice Morse when outlining additional criteria for using a qualitative 
research design; Morse (2011) indicates that a qualitative approach is best employed 
when (1) there is a lack of theory relating to a concept, (2) existing theory may be 
inappropriate, (3) there is a need to explore a phenomenon, or (4) when the nature of the 
phenomenon is not suited to a quantitative approach or cannot be quantified. To this end, 
the phenomenon of Computational Propaganda is a relatively new, which invariably fulfils 
one area of Morse’s criteria, i.e. the lack of theory on the concept. The intention to explore 
strategies, which can mitigate computational propaganda’s effects, dictates that the 
research undertaken was exploratory and thus qualitative. This research report gathered 
insights on how some of South Africa’s most experienced social media managers tackle 
social media crises that arise as a result of Computational Propaganda by gathering their 
opinions on the subject matter. The research approach drew on these social media 
managers’ experience, context, skills and perspectives in order to explore the mitigation 
strategies political parties could implement when facing the threat of Computational 
Propaganda.   
 
3.1.3 Sampling Strategy 
3.1.3.1 Sample Population 
Harper,Laws and Marcus (2007) define sampling as the process of selecting respondents 
within a population, whereas Alvi (2016) defines a population as being all the members 
who meet particular criterion for specified investigation. According to Flick (2015), 
qualitative researchers select participants purposively and integrate small numbers of 
cases based on their relevance, because qualitative research aims to grasp subjective 
meanings of issues from participants’ perspectives. It also brings latent meanings of 
situations into focus so the practises and lives of participants are known. For this reason, 
the researcher is not  required to produce a statistical representative sample as one would 
when conducting quantitative research. Therefore, large sample sizes are not as critical to 





Given the sequential nature of the research, this study drew on two sample populations: 
the first sample population drew upon social media managers in South Africa, while the 
second sample population drew on political party representatives operating in the 
communications functions of their organisations. Within both these sample populations, 
people have different backgrounds with varying levels of expertise, so a clearly defined 
sample is necessary. 
 
3.1.3.2 The Sample 
The research sample was selected using the purposive, non-probability method wherein a 
population of social media practitioners and political party representatives were drawn 
upon and sampled for in-depth interviews (Creswell 2014). Purposive, non-probability in 
this instance indicates that respondents who were selected to participate in the primary 
research, were selected intentionally using substitute criteria such as work experience and 
areas of expertise within their field of work, and due to this, only certain members of the 
population have been selected to take part in the research (Wagner, Kawulich and Garner, 
2012). Initially, the intent was to interview political party agents, and then based upon their 
insights, approach social media managers for guidance on how to mitigate against 
Computational Propaganda. Unfortunately, due to unavailability of political party agents, 
the opposite occurred. 
 
For the first stage of research the purposive, non-probability approach was taken to select 
eight social media professionals for in-depth interviews (Creswell, 2014). The required 
sample were social media professionals that have had five year’s social media experience 
in addition to experience managing social media accounts of brands represented in 
Ornico’s (2017) African Brand Index, which ranks the top 20 best performing brands on 
social media. Within this ranking system, broadcasters, banks, telecommunications and 
automotive industries received the most representation, which may be a result of these 
industry’s high levels of engagement, large follower sizes and high user involvement. The 
respondents were selected using a snowball sample in which members of a social media 
manager’s forum were asked to refer social media managers who had experience working 
on the telecommunications, bank, broadcast and automotive brands in the Africa Brand 
Index list. The rationale behind selecting social media managers who have experience 
from working on South Africa’s twenty best brands according to Ornico’s 2017 Africa 
Brand Index was based on the notion that the private sector has led innovation at the 
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intersection of brand equity and social media, and is likely to have the most relevant 
insights for political brands facing crises in the space. Large private sector brands with 
large followings are also more likely to have encountered different types of complaint or 
hostile behaviour, which may further assist their political counterparts.  
 
The second sample of respondents were also arrived upon by using the purposive, non-
probability approach. While the initial sample included political party agents responsible for 
managing social media at four of South Africa’s largest political parties, only two parties 
agreed to participate, ultimately this sample was reduced to one due to availability 
problems. 
 
To this end, the research sample for political parties is the Head of Communications in the 
Gauteng branch of South Africa’s largest political party, the ANC. This communications 
officer who actively manages the social media account of the party in the Gauteng offered 
insights on how the ANC was dealing with computational propaganda during these in-
depth interviews. South Africa’s largest party (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2014) is 
relevant to the research because incumbent parties are most susceptible to being victims 
of computational propaganda based on trends from global Computational Propaganda 
research (Woolley and Howard, 2017).  
 
3.1.4 Data Collection 
In-depth interviews were selected as the method of data collection in this research study. 
According to Boyce and Neale (2006), in-depth interviews are a qualitative research 
technique which entails conducting intensive individual interviews with a small number of 
respondents in order to explore new issues in depth. These interviews were conducted 
face-to-face using nine supervisor approved semi-structured interview questions for the 
social media managers and six supervisor approved semi-structured interview questions 
for the political party’s Head of Communications. Cohen (2006) indicates that semi-
structured interviews allow the researcher to follow topical trajectories that may stray from 
interview guides if the researcher determines it to be appropriate. In Mastering the Semi-
Structured Interview and Beyond, Anne Galletta (2013) touches on the strengths of semi-
structured interviews by pointing out that they can help attend to complexity and 
phenomena in need of contextualisation. In addition, Galleta notes that semi-structured 
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interviews are sufficiently structured to address specific dimensions of the research 
question, while leaving space for participants to offer new meanings to the topic of study. 
 
The pitfalls of semi-structured interviews are numerous and the ability to mitigate against 
these pitfalls is highly dependent on the skills of the individuals conducting the interviews. 
Creswell (2014) indicates that the results of in-depth interviews can be negatively 
impacted by the researcher’s presence, which may bias responses; alternatively, data 
captured may be adversely affected by the researcher’s inability to encourage articulation 
on the part of the respondent. Galletta (2014) suggests it is important that the researcher 
pays attention to the respondent’s narrative as it unfolds. Furthermore, the researcher 
must guide respondents with further inquiry while refraining from leading respondents, 
which is ultimately an extremely delicate balance. Respondents of this research study 
were interviewed in neutral public environments; interviews were recorded on two devices, 
while field notes were taken to note respondent’s interactions. Great care was taken to 
extract unique perspectives that may have arisen as a result of answers to initial 
questions, without leading respondents to desired answers. 
 
3.1.5 Data Analysis 
A number of methods can be used to analyse data collected. Woods and Gaber (2016) 
correctly point out that selecting procedures that best meet the philosophic orientation of 
the research is the responsibility of the researcher. However, the researcher must ensure 
methodological rigour regardless of the approach taken. Marshall and Rossman (1999) 
define data analysis as a process of ordering, structuring and providing meaning to a mass 
of collected data. Miles, Huberman and Saldaña’s (2014) approach to content analysis of 
qualitative data, which entails data reduction, data display, verification and coding was 
chosen as a method to analyse the output of the interviews with the social media 
managers. Content analysis is the procedure for analysing textual material of whatever 
origin, it aims to classify the content of texts by categorizing statements, sentences or 
words (Flick, 2015). Creswell (2014) indicates that the intent behind content analysis is to 
make sense out of text and data, which involves segmenting and taking data apart.  
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Elo and Kyngäs (2008) indicate that there are two distinct approaches to content analysis, 
where theory exists, a deductive approach is taken, whereas an inductive approach is 
taken when research is exploratory. The inductive approach focuses on specific units of 
analysis, which are later combined into larger segments or categories.  
According to Flick (2015), when using the inductive approach the content analysis method 
follows four distinct phases. The first phase entails transcribing and summarising the 
content, summarising allows one to omit unimportant or redundant passages. This phase 
is commonly known as the reduction phase. The second phase termed coding, entails 
assigning a code to each recurring subject matter. Coding is essentially a way of grouping 
concepts in categories in order to uncover themes. The third phase entails classifying or 
indexing subject matter under themes outlined in phase two. The fourth phase entails 
presenting the themes in a manner that answers the research question. 
Finally, once the themes from semi-structured interviews were identified, these were 
overlaid with responses from the political party communications officer in order to assess 
existing gaps in the political party’s approach and suggest mitigation strategies that may 
be employed by them. 
 
Although great care was taken to collect and analyse data correctly, one pitfall of the 
research conducted was that data collection and analysis occurred separately. Separating 
the data collection from the data analysis process means that the research conducted 
does not benefit from collecting new data to fill in gaps or test new hypotheses that 
emerge during analysis (Miles, Huberman and Saldaña, 2014). Miles, Huberman and 
Saldaña (2014) suggest a process of concurrent data collection and analysis, which allows 
the researcher to think about existing data and creating strategies for collecting new and 
better data.  
 
3.1.6 Ethics 
Beyond the written consent required by interviewees, the sensitive nature of politics within 
the South African context dictates that it is necessary to represent political party 
representatives and social media managers as anonymous, in keeping with their rights to 
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privacy in accordance with points 11.1 and 11.2 of the University of Johannesburg code of 
academic and research ethics (2007). 
 
An ethical consideration that significantly affects the study’s validity is the ability to test the 
efficacy of computational risk mitigation strategies proposed by social media practitioners. 
It is not possible to test mitigation strategies without engaging in Computational 
Propaganda itself, which contains an element of misinformation. Doing so may have 
damaging effects on individuals that come across it, so this was not done, in accordance 
with point 5.3.2 of the University of Johannesburg’s academic code of conduct (2007) 
 
3.1.7 Trusworthiness  
In order for research to be persuasive and trustworthy it’s important to show that the 
methods and conclusions of the research are credible, transferable, dependable and 
confirmable. Guba (1981). According to Guba (1981), credibility in the context of 
qualitative research refers to the truth-value of a study and the confidence one can have in 
the truth of the research findings, whereas confirmability relates to objectivity or neutrality 
in undertaking the research. Both credibility and confirmability were attained through the 
triangulation of sources (Turner and Turner, 1970), wherein two different populations were 
interviewed. In addition to this, respondents with different perspectives were interviewed 
individually, over different periods of time, in a variety of settings.  
Guber (1981) indicates that two other elements of quality research is the ability for 
academics to transfer findings to other contexts and consistently coming to a similar 
conclusion if research is repeated through stable measurement. These two concepts are 
described as transferability and dependability respectively. The dependability of this study 
was ensured by an auditable trail of data starting with an interview schedule and 
recordings of social media managers and political communications officers based on 
supervisor approved interview questions. These recordings were referred back to the 
respondents after the interviews for their approvals. The respondents subsequently signed 
research consent forms and following this, interviews were thematically coded at both 




3.1.8 Limitations of the Study 
There may be gaps in how literature reflects the manifestation of Computational 
Propaganda and how this exists in the South African context. In addition to this, the nature 
of South African politics means the sample size from political party’s is small given that 
only one political party agent availed themself to provide insights into how they deal 
Computational Propaganda. The assumption of this study is that social media practitioners 
from the private sector lead social media best practice, although private sector brands are 
often recognised for their excellence, it does not necessarily mean they are equipped or 
have any experience in dealing with individuals who are ideologically motivated and intent 
on wilfully damaging brands.  
 
Furthermore, the unfortunate deviation from the original research design means the 
interviews conducted with the social media managers do not benefit from the context 
created by the interview with the political party’s representative. Despite this, it is important 
to note that the political party agent’s responses were captured without their knowledge of 
the social media manager’s answers. Any alignment or correlation between the social 
media manager’s responses and those of the political party representative indicates that 
the political party is engaging in some positive practices. 
 
In addition to the limitations illustrated above, the data collection and analysis phases were 
done one after the other, which present a problem from a research optimisation 
perspective. According to Miles, Huberman and Saldaña (2014), the data collection from 
the data analysis process means that the research conducted does not benefit from 
collecting new data to fill in gaps or test new hypotheses that emerge during analysis. 
Given that the research aims to provide insights, the small sample size, unique context 
and use of the purposeful non-probability sampling method mean that the research may 
not be generalisable. 
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4 . Chapter 4 
4.1 Exploring mitigation strategies for computational 
propaganda 
4.1.1 Introduction 
The research data codified in the following passages originate from eight interviews 
conducted with social media managers who have experience operating in a wide range of 
industries from telecommunications, banking, broadcasting, automotive, petrochemicals, 
retail, and airlines. The respondents surveyed all have a minimum five years of social 
media working experience, having operated as hands-on community managers and 
subsequently played strategic roles leading social media teams. This selection ensures 
respondents have the right balance of hands-on experience attending to comments, 
queries, complaints and crises; mixed with the ability and experience from operating at 
strategic levels on the social media accounts of South Africa’s biggest brands.  
 
In order to attain a wide range of perspectives, social media managers who work both for 
corporates and agencies were interviewed. According to Mike Stopforth, founder of 
Cerebra, one of South Africa’s most awarded social media agencies, outsourcing 
corporate social media is a short term solution (Mike Stopforth, 2014) and over the long 
term, corporates should insource this function. Recently, insourcing has become a trend 
amongst large organisations and has led the rise of the social media community 
management function taken internally. While social media agencies have long operated at 
the cutting edge of social media management, it is important to incorporate perspectives of 
those managing social media accounts within organisations, because political parties may 
be taking the same approach due to the sensitive nature of their work. To that end, three 
respondents represented internal corporate-based social media teams, while five 
respondents were agency-based. Job titles amongst respondents surveyed include, Social 
Media Account Director, Group Online Media Manager, Head of Social Media, Social 
Media Director, Social Media Strategist, Digital Social Media Content Manager, Social 
Content Lead, and Social Media Brand Manager.  
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After the interviews were conducted they were transcribed for analysis, which entailed 
outlining common themes and ascribing codes to these themes.  
The data was then organised and displayed according to each respondent’s answers so 
as to illustrate patterns, the rationale being that commonalities in responses might present 
possible mitigation strategies that political parties can further explore and bring light to 
important issues that should be considered when coming into contact with computational 
propaganda. What follows is a code matrix showing main themes uncovered in interviews. 
Interview Code Matrix 
Question Respondents 
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 
1         
2 ACCS,ORM 
OBJ 
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CENS CENS ENGA ENGA 
 
The table below provides descriptions to the codes contained in the matrix above. 
 Code Matrix Descriptions 
Code Description  
ACCS Accessibility: Ability for users to openly engage political parties 
ALF Algorithmic Filtering: Algorithms that filter information served to social 
media users based on their interests or what users are most likely to 
engage with. 
AUTO Automation: Use of digital technology to perform repetitive tasks, 
commonly used to refer to bots. 
BRAND Brand Identity: Brand image, tone, personality, logo and graphics. 
Elements by which brands are commonly identified. 
CENS Censorship: Suppression of communication 
CALM Communication Alignment: Similar policy-based messaging from all 
members of a political organisation 
RSK Digital Brand Risk:  Any element that can diminish total brand value 
online.  
INTCM Integrated Communication: Communicating the same message across 
media channels in channel-relevant way. 
ORM Online Reputation Management: Detecting and analysing content then 
interacting online with consumers based on this analysis. 
OBJ Operational Objectives: Objectives that concern the day-to-day social 
media management. 
PRAC Proactive Communication: Proactive engagement with customers via 
social media. 
SMMC Social Media Crisis Communication: The process of responding to crises 
on social media with the intention of de-escalating such crises. 
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ENGA Social Media Engagement 
STRAT Strategy: Long-term plan social media plan intended to reach a specific 
aim. 
 
What follows is a discussion of the research data based on the themes presented, this will 
be contrasted against responses received from a regional head of communications from 
South Africa’s largest political party. The main themes arising from the semi-structured 
interviews centred around issues of Brand Identity, Communications Alignment, 
Communication Integration, Social Mediated Online Reputation Management. Ancillary 
themes centred around Engagement, Algorithmic filtering and Censorship versus Freedom 
of Speech; while the ancillary themes did not feature prominently there were deemed 
important to include given the framework of critical modernism that has been employed for 
this study.  
 
The interviews with social media managers revealed a strong interplay amongst certain 
themes, so for the purpose of coherence, the themes uncovered in the content analysis 
have been grouped as follows. 
Preventative measures: 
• Brand Identity 
• Communication Alignment 
 
Defensive measures: 
• Online Reputation Management 
• Communication Integration 
 
Contextual Considerations: 
• Algorithmic filtering and engagement 




4.1.2 Preventative Measures 
The overarching commonality between respondents was that they worked in general to 
prevent communications crises. These themes relate to measures political parties can put 
in place to help prevent or reduce the likelihood that they fall victim to social media crises 
in general or as a result of Computational Propaganda.  
 
4.1.2.1 Issues of brand identity 
In most of the interviews conducted with social media managers, the most prominent 
theme related to a focus on brand identity, and how political parties can import stringent 
brand management (Ahmed, Lodhi and Ahmad, 2017) practices from the private sector in 
order to improve their social media impact and protect political brands in communications 
crises’.  
As a starting point, it was acknowledged that the principles of brand management on 
social media apply to political parties in the same way they do to corporates, as pointed 
out by respondent 6 (R6): “… they [political parties] are a brand with a reputation that they 
need to build and protect. … the things that we do as social media managers relate to 
protecting brands and creating brand affinity with our audience and at the end of the day 
that is what a political party is, they want to create brand affinity with an audience so that 
audience can vote for them.” 
Respondent 1 (R1) essentially affirms the relevance of brands in the political context as 
postulated by Ahmed, Lodhi and Ahmad (2017). Respondent 3 (R3) brings a little more 
detail to Respondent 6’s example by pointing out how corporates use brand based tools to 
enact effective social media management: “I think to be honest many people say it's 
supposed to be strategic and high level, for me the most important things are really the 
basics, so for example, a brand tone and a good moderation plan. So when I speak to you 
is your approach to reply or not say anything, what kind of plan do you have in place for 
negative and positive experiences?” Further to this, three respondents noted that the 
Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) are one of the best parties at effectively at managing 
their brand. They went further to point out that this effectiveness has extended into social 
media, to the point that their single-minded message has rallied like-minded individuals 




To this end, Respondent 7 (R7) says: “If you go online, be consistent, have a message 
and stand by it. If you respond to every troll, you’ll never get to why people should think 
you’re interesting and vote for you. … With the EFF next year it's going to be land and 
every EFF person in this country, the only thing they will say is we want the land, you can 
say what you want until you’re blue in the face.”  
Respondent 1 (R1) confirms Respondent 7’s (R7) assessment: “Have a strategy that 
speaks back to your values, stick to your guns on social media, if you’re argumentative be 
that, don’t change because you’re on social media, they [EFF] act on social media just as 
they do in parliament.”  
 
Another theme linked to brand identity is related to how political parties can use their 
brands as a bulwark against attacks. Regarding this, one respondent (R4) noted: 
“Although political organisations do have a level of branding, I do think it’s not as as 
heavily invested in from a protection perspective.”  
 
Brand management in the context of protection, is the notion that continuous investment in 
brand identity, and how stringent adherence to good branding principles can give political 
brands the ability to passively defend against attacks or communications crisis. By 
ensuring good brand management, political parties help social media audiences identify 
that they are potentially dealing with misinformation, because the content they see from 
bad actors does not fit with their brand’s values. Alternatively, good brand management 
can help audiences recognise that a piece of fake content does not originate from the 
brand it is purported to be from because the content does not fit the organisation’s 
corporate identity.  
 
Respondent 5, (R5) affirms this idea with her illustration on the power of good brand 
governance wherein she points out how a social media account she manages experienced 
an account hack. Her team were quickly alerted to the hack by fans of the brand because 
the messages and comments published by their account were not in accordance with the 
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brand’s established tone: “We were getting a lot of messages from fans saying, guys 
what’s wrong, what’s going on, your tone of voice is off, everything is wrong.” 
 
Respondent 2 (R2) reinforces the power of good brand practice by suggesting this allows 
parties to be selective in what misinfortmation they attend to. Respondent 2 does so by 
pointing out that internet users have become savvy and are able to indentify 
unsophisticated computational propaganda: “Internet users are becoming savvy to fakes 
and frauds. They notice if logos aren’t correct and even grammatical errors.”  
Respondent 7 (R7) verifies Respondent 2’s (R2) take on this change: “What I’ve seen in 
the last few years is the general social media population wising up to identifying fake 
accounts and we tend not to react as quickly.” 
Respondent 5 reinforces the idea that strong brands can be selective in their responses to 
social crises as a result of brand power and an acknowledgment that a response can be 
risky because it has potential to bring more attention to the crisis or misinformation: “You 
need to look at your monitoring tools to decide if something is worth responding to. You’ve 
got to look at it like minority versus the majority of stuff, sometimes stuff might have a 
small spike and then die out ...otherwise you risk bringing more eyeballs.”  
 
Respondent 6 however, indicates that some political parties, specifically the EFF, have 
managed to implement branding principles successfully to the extent that they do not need 
to defend themselves in times of crisis. Respondent 6 is the fourth person in our sample of 
eight to positively reference the EFF’s use of social media:  
I’m not sure if it’s the result of the party’s strategy or if it’s a result of the community, but 
they [the EFF] have built a strong brand on Twitter to the point that if you say something 
negative, there is this EFF Twitter army that will defend them. 
 
In contrast to Respondent 6’s glowing assessment, Respondent 1 suggests that the EFF’s 
loyal following may not be the result of good brand practices, but rather the use of 
Computational Propaganda. Respondent 1 alludes to this in their response to whether they 
are familiar with communications crises that have been initiated by bot networks or fake 
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accounts: “Whenever someone tweets something negative about the EFF, there’s a flurry 
of tweets defending them. There is also an increase in social media accounts with partially 
incorrect black names that are tweeting against the EFF. There’s a lot of that right now, 
another thing is we’re headed to election year next year.”  
 
Respondent 1’s assessment is ratified by research conducted by Superlinear and Daily 
Maverick (Haffajee, 2019), which suggests the EFF has engaged in four ‘disinformation 
campaigns’ to date. The data, which was collected over the course of three years, uses 
network analysis to indicate the EFF has been able to mobilise vast networks of Twitter 
users to shape narratives around Pravin Gordhan, VBS Mutual Bank, Eskom and the 
SARS Rogue Unit. In two instances, this social media activity spilled over to traditional 
media. A point of contention however, is whether bot networks, or human curation initiated 
these disinformation campaigns.  
 
The respondent’s identification of the EFF as having good social media capabilities 
coupled with evidence of their Computational Propaganda activities suggest that 
Computational Propaganda is more sophisticated than the respondents think, and that 
some of our respondent’s suggestions, may not be effective mitigation strategies due to 
not having an appreciation of Computational Propaganda’s sophistication. Despite this 
potential flaw, it’s important to point out that the concept of brand identity being an 
important defence mechanism against crises and misinformation is in line with Timothy 
Coombs’ (2007) Situational Crisis Communication Model outlined in Chapter 1. The 
Situational Crisis Communication Model takes the contextual nature of an organisation’s 
reputational threat into account before suggesting response strategies. According to 
Coombs, one of the key aspects affecting an organisation’s ability to respond to a threat is 
the organisations reputation or brand equity at the time of crisis.  
Interestingly, the political party respondent was in close alignment to social media 
managers on the importance of upholding stringent brand management practises in order 
to mitigate against the effects of fake news. The respondent indicates that the biggest 
threat to political parties and media in general is fake news: “Anybody can create 
content and anybody can publish content, so the security of content is not really, well there 
is no security of content really, because of that you have to build your reputation and 
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credibility. Branding and imagery, PR, your image management becomes very important 
so that people know by looking they can pick up what is fake and what is not, I think we’re 
getting better at it.”  
 
The ANC Respondent nevertheless acknowledged that improvement should be made in 
this regard. In terms of consistency in brand tone, the respondent indicates that the party 
has noted the interactive value of social media, so great effort is made to ensure 
consistency before any content is published or announcements are made: “We've had to 
adapt the way in which we communicate because it's quick and because it's immediate, 
everything has got to go at the same time to everybody. So the way we package our 
communication is to be able to prepare adequately for responses to possible issues that 
may come up in whatever we raise.”  
 
With that being said, the respondent also gives an indication that the party also aim to play 
to the strengths of social media, which is its interactivity, suggesting that an overemphasis 
on playing it safe in order to mitigate against brand risk may prevent the party from 
achieving its goals: “In Gauteng we have the highest population of the country 
concentrated in the smallest area space and the majority of those are young people, so if 
you really want to reach citizens and interact with them and have meaningful public 
participation at government level, you’ve got to use social media”. 
The respondent further argues: “As head of communications portfolio in the province my 
role and responsibility in the party is what we call the battle of ideas, which is to discuss 
and engage with society on critical issues and political discourse both internally and 
externally, both in the government and party, the goal is to interact with society.”  
 
The respondent raises an important consideration for political parties about the balance 
between well planned and produced content that conforms with corporate identity, versus 
ephemeral content which is growing in popularity amongst the youth. Ephemeral content is 
raw in-the-moment social media content that disappears within 24 hours (Sheetrit, 2017), it 
serves to communicate authenticity and capture real live situations, taking the form of live 
broadcasts on Facebook and Instagram or short video stories on Facebook, Instagram, 
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SnapChat and WhatsApp. Ephemeral content has been identified as an increasingly 
effective way to connect and engage with millennial social media users (Andrews, 2018), 
which makes striking a balance an important consideration. 
 
4.1.2.2 Communications Alignment 
The second prominent theme uncovered in the content analysis related to communication 
alignment. More specifically, it focuses on how disparate messaging negatively impacts 
political party brands’ social media efforts, and puts these political parties in a position of 
vulnerability. Respondent 8 (R8) touches lightly on communication alignment with 
reference to brand, indicating that documented processes are important for governance 
and communication alignment: “A social media playbook and guide is so important, it 
shows individuals how they show up online. In corporate, you don’t have a problem where 
employees speak for brands unless they’re CEOs, in political parties there are individual 
representatives too.” 
 
Respondent 3 (R3) points out that alignment can act as a defence mechanism, ultimately 
closing gaps that may open political organisations up to misinformation and false 
narratives: “What we need to do is ensure consistency around that truth, authenticity as 
well as an unyielding commitment to living out that truth…a brand has to ensure that all 
platforms and touch points have a level of consistency, so if someone does believe 
something about your brand, you can prove them wrong.”  
 
Respondent 1 (R1) further reinforces the importance of alignment, while pointing out the 
potential pitfalls that come with not having the correct procedures on place. “Parties like 
the ANC will have one area of the organisation tweet something that’s totally out of step 
with what the entire organisation is saying. It’s important to have checks and balances. 
Also don’t have random accounts, the ANC has dormant accounts that aren’t being used, 





Respondent 4 also touches on how hackers and impersonators can aid in the spread of 
misinformation by referring to a recent crisis at the Global Citizen Festival, wherein 
criminals targeted concert goers en masse. Respondent 4 alleges that the 
communications crisis the South African Police Service (SAPS) dealt with was 
exacerbated by a parody account that was impersonating the South African Minister of 
Police. “We see today for example the Global Citizen concert that happened on Sunday 
and the subsequent problems that ensued at various locations including service stations, 
there was a parody account for the Commissioner of Police Bheki Cele, and that parody 
account was leaving comments and people were thinking that this was the official 
minister.”  
 
Hackers are not the only worry for non-aligned political organisations on social media, 
according to two respondents, political party community managers and representatives 
risk being bated into emotive exchanges, leaving themselves at odds with their party’s 
communication objectives. This type of misalignment ultimately creates more opportunities 
for bad actors to capture these exchanges and use them for nefarious purposes. 
Respondent 3 (R3) touches on the potential for individuals to be baited into negative 
exchanges: “It’s so important to have your themes and [content] pillars set out initially so 
your message is clear and you aren’t sort of tempted to sway and put your own view in, 
especially when it’s political.”  
 
Respondent 7 gives context to the importance of alignment amongst key political figures 
by providing some contextual examples. The respondent then proceeds to bolster the 
importance of alignment by providing perspective on its role in one of South Africa’s most 
impactful Computational Propaganda campaigns: “It’s like the DA, there’s a guy in PE, 
Renaldo Gouws, his individual views are always clear, but they don’t always align with the 
DA’s views or policies…You need a core party strategy and then to think of a strategy and 
a process for individuals as well … I think the Gupta campaign was so hard to defuse 
because there was a definite golden thread, and message that ran through all of it. As the 
media, rival political parties and citizens, we were fighting all these individuals, but that 




 Although Respondent 7 touches on the effectiveness of a Computational Propaganda 
campaign, the respondent inadvertently reinforces the argument for succinct brand identity 
coupled with message alignment which are two key constructs of integrated marketing 
communication, which according to Baalen and Mulder (2016) enables companies to 
integrate promotional mix elements with elements of brand so as to create a unified 
message.  
 
When describing the social media operating structure of the ANC, the political party 
respondent went to great lengths to indicate that the party had well-defined approval 
structures with a centralised communication function at the center: “The use of official 
accounts for content and centralising communications has helped, so in the ANC you have 
dedicated spokespersons. During elections it does get a bit blurred because of the amount 
of work that we do on a daily basis, but still the communication lines are quite defined in 
ANC. So in each structure there's a political head responsible for the content, so that's the 
office of the secretariat where it’s the secretary their deputies and the spokespersons, so 
the three of us are responsible for everything that goes out. In terms of social media you 
would have people that create content whether its visual content it doesn't matter but it 
goes out on approval.”  
 
The respondent does however indicate there are instances in which unsanctioned 
messaging is published. This indication may point to merit in Respondent 3’s assertion that 
those managing the accounts of political parties could risk being baited into negative 
exchanges due to an inability to separate one’s own opinions from those of the party. The 
respondent does however indicate that in instances where this occurs, the party is quick to 
distance itself from such views: “Where you may have seen, or when it [the approval 
process] doesn’t happen and political principals haven’t approved it, then we’re quick to 
say that this is staff of the organisation or whatever. It does create a bit of a PR mess 
sometimes but we do disown PR content that's not approved.”  
 
The respondent goes further to indicate that the party also has issues of alignment 
between individual party brands and the political party brand as indicated by Respondents 
7 and 3: “Another threat is the blurred lines of party position versus personal views. So an 
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official of the party would say something, which is his personal views, which he has a right 
to do, but, if they straddle into areas of policy it becomes really difficult, so that's always a 
threat. It's not possible to… we do have communications protocol, it's in black and white 
it's approved, everybody has them, but you're not always able to police human behaviour. 
At the end of it you find yourself always having to put out fires or reminding people what 
they can and can't do. I think another threat especially for an organisation is when internal 
mechanisms are not as effective as they should be, you then find members turning to 
social media to express frustrations and irritations.”  
 
While approval processes do exist within the party, social media is fast paced, and for an 
organisation aiming to engage with youth on its platforms, consideration should be given to 
process behind reactive engagements on social media where exchanges are rapid and 
require quick thinking. Ultimately this candid response reinforces the importance of 
Respondent 3’s suggestion that political parties set out content pillars and clear policy 
indicating response do’s and don’ts when staff respond from official party accounts. In 
terms of individual versus party views, it may beneficial to either enforce disciplinary 
measures or delineate what party representatives can include in their social media 
biography, such as party affiliations, this is a practice that is common in the private sector. 
That being said, political parties do not operate in a vacuum, robust opinions, ideas and 
debate are core to the arena in which politicians operate. So while there may be merit in 
suggestions from social media managers who suggest individual communication policies 
be implemented, they provide this advice without having an appreciation that debate and 
discourse is a key performance indicator for the political party’s social media team.  
 
The data gathered from social media managers and the political party respondent indicate 
that good brand management practices like adherence to corporate identity and 
communication consistency can help reduce the risk of Computational Propaganda. For 
the ANC at least, this seems to be an area of focus, and may apply to other political 
parties. Unfortunately, a focus on brand identity and alignment of messaging across 
political party brands can only assist to minimise the effects of Computational Propaganda 
in very specific instances, such as instances of misinformation as a result of impersonation 
of accounts or political parties. Other instances relate to when inflammatory content is 
shared and made to look as if it originates from a particular party. While the measure 
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outlined may be effective against these forms of misinformation, they are but two ways of 
combatting Computational Propaganda so that those who come into contact with it are not 
affected by it. The following passages look at respondents’ suggestions on how to actively 
deal with the spread of misinformation as a social media manager. 
 
4.1.3 Defensive Measures 
The common characteristic of themes within the defensive measures cluster is that they 
are a step beyond the passive solutions offered by the social media managers, and entail 
methods in which to actively react and manage communication crises that arise as a result 
of computational propaganda. These measures, when assessed, ostensibly draw on two 
areas in particular: online reputation management and integrated marketing 
communication. 
 
4.1.3.1 Online Reputation Management 
The first point of departure with regard to exploring mitigation strategies for social media is 
whether it is possible to mitigate against misinformation propagated by automation and 
algorithms by changing the perceptions of those who have come into contact with it. The 
general consensus, from six of eight respondents is that this is possible, however, doing 
so would be extremely difficult and would require a multidisciplinary approach. The 
foundation of any multidisciplinary approach would be online reputation management. As 
indicated in Chapter One, online reputation management is the process of monitoring 
media, detecting relevant contents, analysing what people say about an entity and if 
necessary, interacting with customers (Amigo, Artiles, Gonzalo, Spina, Liu and Corujo, 
2010).  
 
Respondent 1’s answer on how a social media crisis should be handled aligns perfectly 
with the online reputation process espoused by Amigo et al (2010): “The first thing about a 
crisis is don’t assume what a crisis is, get to the crux of it, what is the issue? Secondly, 
check where the sentiment is and where most of the complaints are coming from, then 
acknowledge the issue, but don’t ignore while investigating, really do investigate, 
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communicate it and get to the crux of whatever the crisis could be. In that process keep 
updating people as to where you are in it.”  
 
While respondents have their own methodologies that have been developed within their 
agencies and companies, their responses generally fall within the detect, analyse, interact 
process, however when asked how they would recommend political parties actively 
mitigate against crises brought as a result of misinformation campaigns initiated by bots 
and automation, respondents adapted the online reputation management process to a 
more multidisciplinary approach. Detection and analyses remained, but the third step 
varied.  
 
Respondent three explains the detection aspect: “The hardest thing is people can create 
accounts whether its bots or not, especially with bots faster than you can shut things down, 
so I think in that case the easiest way is to be on really high alert and have all your alerts 
set up so that you get sort of pinged immediately as soon as a bot, and you would know 
it’s a bot because they will probably spit out 20 tweets in two minutes.”  
 
Respondent 5 on the other hand, covers the analysis aspect: “It’s important to first analyse 
volumes, data and sentiment, otherwise you risk bringing more eyeballs, another thing is 
influence, it could be one hundred people tweeting with no followership or one tweeting 
with a big followership of 100 000.”  
 
While not going into detail about the ANC’s online reputation management process, the 
political party respondent indicated that the ANC does engage in monitoring all media 
formats including social media: “So we do have a monitoring system we monitor media as 
a whole and a big part of that is social media. So we monitor the reach, we monitor the 
interactions, we monitor the negative, and the positive and we monitor the issues that 
come up as people engage. When there's topical issues outside of election periods we 




The respondent goes on to indicate that the party has been able to identify bots because 
of the way they operate as soon the ANC account publishes content. The respondent had 
the following to say in response to how they identify bot attacks: “It's the way they operate, 
it's immediate, they are issue based and they pick on certain things all the time, so it’s 
easy to identify.”  
 
Further to this, the political party respondent indicates that they, as someone who often 
posts and tweets on behalf of the ANC has been affected by bot campaigns: “There’s quite 
a lot of them. There's always a fight between big parties saying that the DA has a whole 
team of bots and they say the same thing about us. I mean it's impossible to trace and 
police and that sort of thing so people do get away with a lot.” 
 
Continuing with the online reputation management process; following the analysis step, 
respondents deviated in their responses relating to what action should be taken thereafter.  
According to Respondent 1 the best method is to battle content with content: “You need a 
strong strategy around your messaging. What content can you put out there to refute 
claims being made and use different avenues, partnerships and networks to help that 
message reach as many people as possible. Then also use a media strategy, take the 
fake news head on and create content that identifies and debunks it.”  
 
Respondent 7 focuses on the importance of having relationships with social media 
platforms in order to report bot networks and malicious accounts: “I think a lot of it is know 
your enemy, know what you’re up against, if there are short term tactics, like if you come 
up to a Twitter bot network … try and have relationships in place with the platforms so you 
can say, hey, we’ve come across these accounts and believe these accounts to be 
malicious.”  
 
Respondent 6 suggests notifying online communities of misinformation and having the 
organisations’ accounts verified.“A simple thing to do is get all your accounts verified. Sort 
of like a nice technical thing is to you know, make sure that there's no confusion … 
52 
 
continuously communicate to your audience and community that these are you official 
channels. These are our official accounts and if you see anything that looks untoward from 
other accounts it's fake … just ignore it. It's very tricky because with social media there's 
equal power across the board, so the only thing you can do is communicate, we’re official , 
this is not official.” 
 
In providing the above solution Respondent 1 inadvertently touches on a flaw inherent in 
the idea of social distribution of content that aims to debunk fake news on social media; 
social media by its very nature allows users to self-select, because of this it is difficult to 
assess who has come into contact with junk news if one wishes to give those people a 
different perspective.  
 
Respondent 4 touches on this: “I was doing an interview on Al Jazeera and the discussion 
was, is social media subjective or objective and I’m like by its very nature it’s subjective 
because you self-select, because you’re using the search parameters to look for what you 
want to look for, you see what you want to see and it’s almost given a platform for like-
minded individuals to find each other.”  
 
Secondly, the only way to reach these individuals that come into contact with 
misinformation en masse would be via a paid promotion strategy, which may invariably 
raise skepticism (Yaylagul, 2018). Respondent 4 goes on to offer a unique insight into 
actively dealing with Computational Propaganda as a result of having their brand fall victim 
to bots during Bell Pottinger’s White Monopoly Capital Computational Propaganda 
campaign (Khoza, 2018): “We had a tax dispute with SARS last year which we won this 
year, basically SARS were saying we owed them R2 billion. What happened was, some of 
the WMC bots got hold of that and started pushing their narrative that we aren’t playing 
[ball] with government, we’re white monopoly capital, that became a thing and that spread 
on a bot network including a lots of websites like WMC exposed. What we did to counter 
that was just to be frank, go into traditional media, push it out a soon as possible and to 




By including search engine opitimisation as a tactic, Respondent 4’s response outlines a 
possible approach toward dealing with Computational Propaganda as a result of 
automation and algorithms, the first and only response to do so. Search Engine 
Optimisation (SEO) can succinctly be described as the use of various techniques 
marketers and web developers use in order to make their websites rank higher on popular 
search engines (Matošević, 2019). SEO in this context entails targeting specific keywords 
so Respondent 4’s brand messaging appears prominently in searches relating to white 
monopoly capital; this gives the respondent the opportunity to have their message read 
first, it also reduces the impact of Computational Propaganda by reducing the amount of 
traffic going to those sites. Respondent 4’s response crystalizes the importance of a 
multidiscplinary approach to dealing with Computational Propaganda, an insight which will 
be explored further in the following passages. 
 
Although the political party respondent acknowledges that the Computational Propaganda 
or fake news serves as a big threat to political parties they indicate that there are not any 
plans in place to deal with the matter despite being able to identify it. The respondent says 
the follow regarding defensive measures to deal with computational propaganda: “I must 
say, not that I know of, if it's there it's top secret high level stuff, but I don't know anything 
about that. Yeah so I think everybody is struggling with it and I don't think anybody has got 
an absolute answer as to how to deal with them. As a party we don’t have any 
relationships with the social networks, maybe as a state, but not as a party.” 
 
4.1.3.2 Communication Integration 
Integration of brand messages has become an important tenet of modern marketing 
communication as seen with the rise of Integrated Marketing Communication (IMC) during 
the late nineties and early two thousands. The central concept to IMC and subsequent, 
more strategic theories relating to communication integration, is that a single-minded 
message, across multiple media forms, is more impactful than disparate ones (Baalen and 
Mulder, 2016). This idea of integration is encapsulated by Bruhn’s (2008, p. 17) definition 
of IMC which is: 
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“a process of analysis, planning, organization, implementation and monitoring that 
is oriented toward creating unity from diverse sources of internal and external 
communication with target groups to convey a consistent impression of the 
company or the company’s reference object”.  
Subsequent theories of IMC and the more strategic IC have their basis in integration, a 
concept that the respondents of this study also identify as being important to combatting 
the effects of Computational Propaganda. The theme of integrating messages and using 
multiple channels to communicate to end-users was the fourth most popular theme to 
come out of the content analysis. Respondent 7 touches on this: “You need to begin 
engaging with influencers on the platforms as well as media partners to try and mitigate 
and contain the matter by saying look, this is our side of things.”  
 
Respondent 6 warns against an over-reliance on social media suggesting that using other 
platforms such as websites can assist in turning the tide against Computational 
Propaganda: “Another tactic that can be used is always refer back to a website, a credible 
web presence to reaffirm the credibility so say to your community, if this statement is not 
on our website, then its untrue… Don’t be too reliant on your social media presence.”  
Respondent 8 suggests doing the same, albeit more aggressively: “What I would do to 
mitigate against misinformation if I were a political party, would be to bake the facts into 
every piece of communication that goes out and link an information portal at every turn.”  
Respondent 7 references KFC in the UK and their handling of supplier change which led to 
a stock outage, resulting in closed stores across the country and a trend for the 
#KFCCrisis hashtag (Topping, 2018). The respondent indicates that KFC turned the crisis 
into a positive by rolling out a print ad which swopped the words KFC to FCK, wittingly 
using its powerful brand name to admit failure and subsequently trending again and 
earning one billion impressions this time with positive sentiment (Griner, 2018): “There’s 
room to use other channels, as digital people we rely on digital too much and forget the 
real value that a great print advert can do.”  
 
Respondent 1, shows the importance resolving crises in action and not just message, a 
practice which can ostensibly be carried out when debunking misinformation too: “It’s 
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important to take corrective action by linking back to what the company does so as to 
ensure it doesn’t happen again. It shouldn’t just play out on social media, social media is 
just another tool.” 
 
Integrating messages and delivering them across multiple forms of media like television, 
radio, print and coupling this with consistency has become a popular method for building 
brands. Based on the insights provided by the respondents, this may also be a viable 
approach for brands in terms of crisis, whether it be self-inflicted or the result of 
Computational Propaganda. The effectiveness of using multiple channels beyond social 
media to reduce the impact of Computational Propaganda is further reinforced when 
considering that algorithmic filtering is central to how social media platforms operate. What 
this means is that unique content is distributed to users based on their preferences, so 
information debunking fake news may never reach its intended end user.  
 
In terms of communication integration the political party respondent indicates an 
appreciation for distributing a unified message: “We still do rely heavily on traditional 
mediums … Over the years we've had to be able to sort of adapt the way in which we 
engage, so it's almost got to be simultaneous.  In the past we would just issue press 
statement and be interviewed we now do everything at once so when I issue a written 
statement I also do a video recording of the main thrust of this statement as I know society 
can engage with it or media would engage”.  
 
This appreciation for distributing a unified message across social media platforms 
indicates the ANC may be well positioned to take the social media managers’ advice in 
using these channels to debunk misinformation.  
 
A rebuttal to the use of other media channels to distribute information debunking fake 
news may be that some users, by nature of actively consuming fake news, aren’t 
interested in information that may debunk their wrongly held beliefs, a point raised by 
respondent 8: “I see something that supports my belief system, I don’t want to hear a 
56 
 
counter argument, then I want to share it with everyone else to show them I’m right. 
People really want to share things that prop themselves up. There may be instances 
where people have been able to nip things in the bud, but I think the only thing you can do 
is make all the information available and give a link to it like Snope, I think snope is 
amazing and I’m seeing more and more of it in threads where people are using it to 
debunk misinformation.”  
 
Clearly the discussion around algorithmic filtering and beliefs is nuanced, although this 
theme was present in the research, it surprisingly did not feature prominently.  However, 
given that a critical modernism paradigm was chosen to underpin this research, it is 
important to unpack algorithmic filtering, censorship versus freedom and the power 
dynamics at play in computational propaganda, a look at these issues follows. 
 
4.1.4 Contextual Considerations 
4.1.4.1 Engagement and Algorithmic Filtering 
As indicated in Chapter 1, an important premise of the research conducted relates to 
political parties having a plan in place to deal with Computational Propaganda. The 
rationale behind having a plan is that social media platforms may not be fast enough to 
respond to bad actors on social media. Additionally, the fast moving nature of social media 
allows bad actors to continuously find new loopholes to exploit. As Louise Matsakis (2019) 
explains, companies like Facebook continue to play “whack-a-mole” with agents of 
Computational Propaganda. Given these circumstances, my research proposed that 
political parties should use communication techniques as their first line of defence.  
Because social media platforms value engagement to sell advertising, it is difficult for them 
to curb Computational Propaganda. The main drivers of engagement are algorithms, 
which are being exploited for the purposes of computational propaganda. When asked if 
social media platforms are doing enough to curb Computational Propaganda, respondent 
2 indicated:  “No. They are for-profit companies for whom engagement trumps trust.  20k 
people fighting over a fake tweet is better for Twitter than hiring more team members to 




Respondent 8 paints an even more sceptical picture of Facebook. “Facebook sells 
eyeballs, reach and frequency, if they have almost two billion people on Facebook and five 
hundred or six hundred million of them are fake, then it’s not in their best interest to tell you 
or to get rid of them, so they’re conflicted from a business interest point of view.”  
 
Respondent 1 echoes the sentiments of Respondents 2 and 8 but makes a fairer 
assessment by portraying the conundrum social media platforms find themselves in: “Bots 
are odd. It’s good for social networks and bad for them. On one side it inflates their user 
numbers so advertisers approach them. Meanwhile they generate distrust towards the 
social networks. They’re not doing enough but they won’t do enough because its serves 
them not to.”  
 
Although it is easy blame social media platforms, Respondent 5 believes doing so is 
unfair, and that Facebook, Instagram and Twitter have removed or suspended malicious 
accounts in the past, provided users report them. The respondent goes on to point out that 
the sheer scale of these networks make it nearly impossible to stay up-to-date on how bad 
actors are manipulating their platforms: “Their [Facebook’s] two-way communication is 
really good with that and they really come to the party, but it is up to the consumer. I don't 
know if Facebook’s gonna know every single thing with what goes on with their millions of 
users, unless you bring it to the attention. It's just not practical, you can't police the 
internet.”  
 
Respondent 6 shares respondent 5’s sentiment: “… social media is this contradiction 
because everyone has freedom of speech. In my mind I think there's a limited amount of 
things that platforms can do because the more you do that the more you limit people's 
right to freedom of speech. … I think the responsibility lies with the consumer to figure out 




Respondent’s 5 and 6 responses touch on a critical debate taking place in the United 
Kingdom where Computational Propaganda and its effects have led the House of Lords to 
debate whether social media networks should be held to the same standards to which 
publishers are held. BBC journalist Amol Rajal (2016) describes Facebook’s role from the 
perspective of publishers succinctly. “The world's biggest platform, increasingly, has the 
role once fulfilled by news publishers, without the legal restrictions and social obligations.” 
If the UK parliament and publishers succeed with their efforts, platforms like Facebook and 
Twitter will be held responsible for “[f]ake news, extremist content, online bullying, 
harassment and copyright infringement that occurs on their platforms” (Brown, 2018). 
 
4.1.4.2 Freedom of speech and censorship 
Regulating the creation and spread of misinformation creates a conundrum for social 
media platforms, especially where users curate and distribute fake news, not out of 
malicious intent, but out of belief. UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Freedom of 
Expression, Professor David Kaye (2018), notes that increased legislation may lead 
companies to over-regulate their platforms, thereby limiting space for debate, art, politics 
and other forms of expression. Such regulation could unintentionally galvanise unwitting 
arbiters of misinformation under the belief that they are being victimised as a result of 
hidden agendas. Respondent 8 provides a real world example of a similar scenario: “The 
whole thing around infowars that helped galvanize the [Far] right against these platforms is 
because people were asking why are platforms censoring them and not doing the same on 
the left. There’s always a gap between censorship and freedom of speech and it's really 
hard to find that line.”  
 
Respondent 8 also points out that political parties like the ANC, risk aiding censorship by 
reporting accounts they deem to be spreading misinformation. They go on to say that the 





4.1.4.3 Conclusion  
Mitigating against Computational Propaganda is extremely complex, as noted in the 
research results. However, respondents in this study suggest that limiting risk is possible, 
even if there is no silver bullet for solving the problem. Instead, there are preventative 
measures and defensive measures political parties can take. The chosen route any 
political party takes must be done while taking social networks’ bias for engagement and 
practices of algorithmic filtering into account. Furthermore, political parties must be 
cognisant of issues relating to freedom of speech and censorship as some of the 
suggested defensive measures entail having relationships with representatives at these 
social networks in order to report them. However, a close relationship may lead political 





5 . Chapter 5 
5.1 Research Findings and Recommendations 
The research conducted provides some interesting outcomes with regard to how political 
parties can tackle computational propaganda online. Social media managers from some of 
the country’s pre-eminent social media teams provided insight into how they believe social 
media crises should be handled. They also gave insight into how they believe a crisis 
stemming from Computational Propaganda should be navigated, with Respondents having 
similar opinions on how to handle orthodox social media crises but divergent opinions  on 
crises resulting from Computational Propaganda. Despite the divergence of opinion, all the 
social media managers agreed that addressing Computational Propaganda is a complex, 
nuanced, and multidisciplinary task.  
The research provided some guidance on how political parties can try to mitigate against 
Computational Propaganda, covering four areas political parties can focus on, (1) brand 
identity; (2)communication alignment; (3) online reputation management ; and (4) 
communication integration. 
The study also illustrates the power dynamics at play with regard to the phenomenon of 
Computational Propaganda. Events like the Arab Spring were celebrated as social network 
wins since they seemed to have facilitiated a shift of power from incumbent governments 
to the disenfranchised masses, just as social networks shifted power away from brands 
and into the hands of consumers. However, events like the Gupta bots campaign and 
Cambridge Analytica scandals indicate that the same networks that facilitated a shift of 
power to the masses, have also unwittingly facilitated a power shift to rich and powerful 
bad actors who are able mimic mass action with bots and algorithms. Both kinds of shifts 
in power result from social networks deciding who sees what, which then suggests that 
instead of shifting power from elites to the masses, power shifted from governments and 
traditional businesses to social networks. Political parties find themselves playing a 
balancing act in this context, as they have to navigate a landscape in which they need to 
appeal to the masses, while protecting themselves against bad actors, all while standing 
on the shifting sands of social media platforms that have become the world’s most popular 
method of communication. Although this appears to be a daunting task, the research 




5.1.1 Findings as they Relate to the Research Aims and Objectives  
At the outset of this study, the intended aim was to provide insight to political parties on 
how they could mitigate against malicious online brand attacks. In order to reach this goal, 
this study explored how Computational Propaganda manifests itself online, what strategies 
political parties are using to mitigate Computational Propaganda, and which digital brand 
risk mitigation strategies political brands can employ to mitigate the against consequences 
of computational propaganda. What follows are answers to these research objectives 
based on the data gathered.  
1. How does computational propaganda manifest itself online? 
The research focused specifically on bots as the most easily identifiable form of 
computational propaganda because the use of algorithms and curation is a lot more 
targeted and tied to users’ beliefs and interests. Computational Propaganda using 
algorithmic filtering and curation are much harder to identify given their sophistication, as 
illustrated in the Cambridge Analytica scandal in which victims were only aware of the 
attack once a whistle-blower exposed Cambridge Analytica and further investigated which 
Facebook apps had been used (Hern, 2018).  
The findings of this research indicate that bots manifest in a multitude of ways for a 
multitude of purposes, from bots that are used to leak news, to agenda-based bots that 
reply to specific subject matter, to wide sock-puppet networks popularised during the 
“white monopoly capital” leaks misinformation campaigns. All but one respondent indicated 
that they are familiar with bots and have personally come into contact with bots in their 
work. The research further revealed that other types of digital brand risk are also on the 
rise, from accounts imitating brands, to account hacks. Surprisingly, it also showed that 
respondents were aware of curation and algorithms as well as the censorship versus 
freedom of speech debate, which has inadvertently allowed these more sophisticated 





2. What strategies are political parties using to mitigate computational propaganda 
risks? 
Based on the research, the sample of one political party indicates that an effort is being 
made to ensure that stringent brand identity policies are being implemented in order to 
help users identify fake content that is made to look like it originates from the political 
party. In addition to this, great efforts are being made to ensure communication alignment 
between the party’s various social media accounts and its staff to help users identify 
misinformation that is not in line with party policies. Unfortunately, although they make a 
good start, these mitigation strategies only account for specific instances of Computational 
Propaganda. Based on the interview with the political party respondent one can surmise a 
level of apathy in the battle of misinformation, but perhaps none of the South African 
misinformation campaigns were effective enough to warrant defensive action from the 
party, and this may change.  
The political party respondent revealed that agencies are contracted during times of high 
political activity. These agencies help to manage accounts and may serve as a mitigation 
strategy in itself, given the systematic crisis communications processes all agency-based 
respondents employ. Finally, the research indicates that although there is an appreciation 
of the need to mitigate against Computational Propaganda, there is not a tangible 
appreciation of how to develop active defensive systems against it. 
 
3. Which digital brand risk mitigation strategies can political brands employ to 
tackle the brand consequences of Computational Propaganda? 
The research uncovered two types of strategies to help mitigate against the consequences 
of social media. Firstly, preventative measures were considered important. Preventative 
measures serve to reduce the likelihood of a crisis arising as a result of Computational 
Propaganda and include brand identity and communication alignment. Brand identity 
(Keller 2013) measures entail using stringent brand management practices on social 
media such as ensuring every piece of content abides to the political party’s corporate 
identity rules. In other words the political party must use logos, correct tone of voice, 
correct language and only distribute content that aligns with the party’s values. 
Communication alignment entails ensuring communication consistency on all media 
63 
 
platforms. For example, it suggests that individual representatives of political parties 
should not stray too far from the party’s policy. 
Secondly, defensive strategies were considered relevant; these require action from the 
political party’s social media teams. Defensive strategies include online reputation 
management espoused by Amigo et al. (2010), which entails the detection, analysis and 
response to crises. Detection and analysis will help party’s to determine what response 
should be implemented. Tied to response is communication integration as defined by 
Bruhn (2008), or the use of a wide range of media in a unified mannner in order to 
overcome algorithmic filtering, which may limit the reach of the political party’s reactive 
statement.  
While engaging in these defensive measures, it is important for political party social media 
teams to take context into account. The context will determine the extent to which 
defensive measures are taken because political parties risk curtailing the freedom of 
speech of those it deems to be spreading misinformation. Alternatively keeping its 
messaging to social media platforms risks having only a few people see their reactive 
statements, additionally, large groups of loyal supporters may have no need for the party 
to debunk fake news because they trust the party. Therefore, depending on the context 
and nature of the crisis, political parties must consider media channels beyond social 
media. 
The use of online reputation management and unifying one’s message across multiple 
platforms is by no means new, but highlighting these two avenues as credible strategies 
which may help inspire political parties implement this low hanging fruit. General 
consensus amongst social media managers is that the best response to any 
communications crisis is to have a plan, even if it is not completely fool-proof, it reduces 
the likelihood of compounded the crisis as a result of inaction. Surprisingly, one potential 
mitigation strategy that did not emerge from the research is the use of bots and automation 
to assist in the fight against misinformation. The respondents acknowledged that bots are 
able to distribute messages widely at great speed, and for this reason it is possible to use 
bots to flag keywords relating to misinformation and either report them, or tweet to every 
user that responds to misinformation content, outlining why a piece of content is fake 
news. The potential reasons why this wasn’t suggested may be due to cost, time and 





5.1.2 Recommendations for Future Research 
The research conducted focused on Computational Propaganda and exploring mitigation 
strategies for political parties in online contexts, based on the outcomes and engagements 
with political parties. A critical area of research that can be conducted is the investigation 
into social media crises communications strategies political parties have in place as 
compared to those in the private sector. In conducting this research report it was found 
that the value of expertise provided by social media managers was rather limited, which 
may be a result of Computational Propaganda being a relatively new phenomenon, 
whereas an established subject like general crisis communication may lead to better 
transfer of insight on both ends.  
 
In order to achieve this transfer of insight, the study would require a larger sample from 
political parties, a clear clarification on what constitutes a crisis, and specific scenarios to 
which the political party and private sector respondent can reply. Thereafter, brand risk 
mitigation strategies for Computational Propaganda can be revisited with a larger political 
party sample and specific Computational Propaganda scenarios. 
 
5.1.3 Recommendations for Practice 
Based on the research conducted, recommendations for political parties would be to firstly 
institute preventative measures such as improve party wide compliance to organisational 
brand identity on official social media accounts. In addition to this, an engagement protocol 
needs to be established outlining when and how the political party’s staff are to respond in 
terms of reactive and continuous engagement. This protocol must also be contrasted with 
guidelines on when responses must be escalated for approval. In addition to this, it is 
advisable that every individual party representative use a playbook designed by the 
political party in order to guide their engagements. This playbook, while allowing 
individuals to engage in robust debate, should outline critical policy related subject matter 
that should not be engaged upon and rather be referred back to more official channels.  
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Secondly, in order to institute defensive measures, political parties must investigate the 
manner in which computational propaganda operates whether, be it via bots, curation or 
algorithms. Doing so will allow parties to identify new ways in which computational 
propaganda adapts or is manifesting. Following this, it is advised that political parties put in 
measures to detect increased or anomalous levels of computational propaganda activity, 
which they can analyse. With regard to analysis, parties need to determine what level of 
misinformation distribution is negligible, what level requires consistent monitoring and what 
level requires intervention. In terms of the intervention phase, there should be criteria 
determining what misinformation activities require a statement distributed on social media, 
versus what level of misinformation requires an integrated response across multiple media 
channels. These recommendations can serve as a foundation with which to tackle crises 
that arise as a result of computational propaganda. 
 
5.1.4 Conclusion 
Research indicates that computational propaganda is growing in prominence the world 
over and measures taken by countries like Italy and their online task team show the 
importance of dealing with this phenomenon. It is critical that South African political parties 
are cognisant of this as South Africa draws closer to the forthcoming National Elections. 
This research study was conducted in order to explore and bring possible mitigation 
strategies against computational propaganda to the attention of political parties. 
Through a worldview of critical modernism (Mumby, 1997), this research explores  
potential mitigation strategies by using semi-structured interviews (Cohen D, 2006) with 
social media managers and a political party representative. These interviews were 
conducted using purposive non-probability sampling (Laws, Harper and Marcus, 2007).  
Using thematic analysis (Flick, 2015), the study uncovered four different mitigation 
approaches, namely; (1) brand identity; (2)communication alignment; (3) online reputation 
management ; and (4) communication integration. In addition to this, the two contextual 
considerations of algorithmic filtering and engagement, as well as freedom of speech and 
censorship were uncovered. While the outcomes of the research may not be entirely 
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5.7 Appendix E: Communication Misalignment 
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